Walden University

ScholarWorks
Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies

Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies
Collection

2021

Attitudes Toward the Electability of Atheist and Nontraditional
Religious Candidates
Brittany Escobedo
Walden University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.waldenu.edu/dissertations
Part of the Political Science Commons, Religion Commons, and the Social Psychology Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies
Collection at ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies by an
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact ScholarWorks@waldenu.edu.

Walden University
College of Social and Behavioral Sciences

This is to certify that the doctoral dissertation by

Brittany Kali Bullock Escobedo

has been found to be complete and satisfactory in all respects,
and that any and all revisions required by
the review committee have been made.
Review Committee
Dr. Hedy Dexter, Committee Chairperson, Psychology Faculty
Dr. Brandon Cosley, Committee Member, Psychology Faculty
Dr. Charles Diebold, University Reviewer, Psychology Faculty

Chief Academic Officer and Provost
Sue Subocz, Ph.D.

Walden University
2021

Abstract
Attitudes Toward the Electability of Atheist and Nontraditional Religious Candidates
by
Brittany Kali Bullock Escobedo

Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Psychology

Walden University
August 2021

Abstract
Atheists are underrepresented in political office compared to their numbers in the general
population. In the United States, anti-atheist prejudice is prevalent, likely contributing to
the disparity in atheist representation. Informed by social identity theory and the
sociofunctional approach to prejudice, the purpose of this study was to examine the
comparative electability of atheists compared to other minority religious identities, as
well as one nonminority option for a baseline reference of attitudes. Using the voter
likelihood scale and three 7-point semantic differential scales, 579 participants rated their
intention to vote for and their feelings of trust, disgust, and fear toward one of four
political candidates representing different religious groups but who were otherwise the
same candidate (Protestant, Mormon, Scientologist, and atheist) presented to them
randomly. Data were analyzed using four separate 2 X 4 factorial analyses of variance.
Findings suggest that atheists are not viewed as unfavorably as Scientologists (groups
perceived as cults), though atheists were viewed unfavorably on all measures of trust,
disgust, and fear. Generating grassroots discourse about religious minority
underrepresentation in elected office, as well as the prejudicial views many Americans
hold toward minority religions, may build awareness and acceptance leading to positive
social change.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
Introduction
Atheists are underrepresented in political office despite the number of Americans
identifying as atheists having more than doubled in the last few years (Ingraham, 2016;
Lipka, 2016a). A review of the literature suggests that widespread prejudice toward
atheists is based on distrust and the belief that atheists are immoral (Edgell, Gerteis, &
Hartmann, 2006; Franks & Scherr, 2014; Gervais, 2014; Gervais, Shariff, & Norenzayan,
2011). However, despite this, little research has been done to examine atheist prejudice
and discrimination specifically in the political sphere. The stigma of atheists can be seen
throughout U.S. culture; they are seen as a threat to the Christian values on which many
Americans believe the country was founded (Gervais, 2013; Gervais, 2014; Gervais et al.,
2011). As a result, there are no members of Congress who identify openly as atheists
(Sandstrom, 2017). With 91% of the current Congress identify as Christian, there are
many minority religions left unrepresented or not represented proportional to their
respective population representation (Sandstrom, 2017). Viewed as outliers, nonmainstream religious groups, such as Mormons and Scientologists, are marginalized
(Doherty, 2014; Grieg, 2017; Harrison, 2015; McAllister, 2013; Olson, 2006; Penning,
2009; Smith, 2014; Urban, 2012).
This study demonstrates the comparative unelectability of atheists with other
reviled and marginalized minority religious groups, including the emotional responses
these candidates elicit. Different emotions prompt different forms of prejudice, making it
important to examine the ways prejudice toward atheists manifest (Cottrell & Neuberg,
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2005). While atheists remain underrepresented, issues important to them will likely
continue to be ignored. This includes protections for atheists against the many forms of
discrimination they face, such as in child custody cases, the hiring process or in the
workplace (Gervais, Shariff, & Norenzayan, 2011; Volokh, 2006; Wallace et al., 2014).
This chapter will present the problem, purpose, and significance of the study. The
research questions and hypotheses will also be presented. Further, the nature of the
study, including the definitions, assumptions, scope and delimitations, and limitations
will also be discussed.
Background
Research examining anti-atheist prejudice has found the majority of Americans
believe that atheists lack morality and are therefore capable of horrendous acts (Gervais,
2013; Gervais, 2014; Gervais et al., 2011). This view makes it difficult for most people
to trust atheists and is likely partially responsible for atheist underrepresentation in
politics. Only one study, to-date, has examined anti-atheist prejudice in the political
realm, finding that compared to other historically marginalized groups (e.g., Black and
gay men), atheists were the least likely to receive votes and engendered the strongest
feelings of distrust, disgust, and fear responses from participants (Franks & Scherr,
2014).
While public perception of atheists is overwhelmingly negative, evidence
suggests that fringe religious groups that are viewed as “cultish” may be more reviled
than atheists (Cragun, Henry, Homan, & Hammer 2012a; Lalich, 2009; Olson, 2006).
However, these studies did not indicate specific religious designations, using only the
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terms “new religious movement” and “cult” to gauge participant opinions, terms
considered overwhelmingly negative (Cragun et al., 2012a; Olson, 2006). While no
person identifies as belonging to a “cult,” many outside observers believe they do
(Cragun et al., 2012a; Olson, 2006). This pejorative use of cult is commonly used toward
Mormons and Scientologists, suggesting these individuals may have difficulty gaining
acceptance and trust of the general public, particularly in politics (Greig, 2017; Harrison,
2015). For example, during the 2012 Presidential election, concerns over Mitt Romney’s
religious affiliation dwarfed concerns for any other candidate, and voter aversion toward
Mormons has increased following the election (Campbell, Green, & Monson, 2012;
Smith, 2014; Smith, 2016). During the campaign, a pastor introducing Rick Perry
(another Republican candidate during the primary) referred to the Mormon Church as a
cult (Oppel Jr & Eckholm, 2011). This cult perception also extends to Scientology, with
recent documentaries of those that have left the church painting the organization as
sinister and secretive (Doherty, 2014; Gilbert, 2016; McAllister, 2013; Thurm, 2015). A
comparative study of fringe religious groups and atheists in politics had not yet been
conducted (Franks & Scherr, 2014). Therefore, this quantitative study measured voting
intention and the emotional responses of distrust, disgust, and fear toward candidates
identifying as atheist, Mormon, Scientologist, and Protestant.
Problem Statement
Historically marginalized groups such as African Americans and ethnic minorities
(15%), women (20%), and members of the LGBT community (1.5%) have seen great
gains in political representation in the U.S. Congress (Franks & Scherr, 2014). However,

4
individuals who self-identify as atheist are not making these strides; they represent only
0.2% of Congress compared to 20% of the population (Franks & Scherr, 2014). The
115th Congress was assessed for religious affiliation, and the Pew Research Center found
that the Congress was 91% Christian, well overrepresenting the U.S. Christian population
(all Christian denominations combined comprise 70.6% of the population), whereas only
a single member of Congress identifies as unaffiliated and no members identify as a
nontraditional religion such as Scientology (Sandstrom, 2017). Protestants, Catholics,
and Jews are all overrepresented in Congress, while groups such as Muslims, Buddhists,
and Mormons have equal representation in Congress proportional to the U.S. population
(Sandstrom, 2017). Despite the fact that atheists are one of the most rapidly growing
minority groups and continually rank as one of the least accepted groups in the United
States, anti-atheist prejudice in politics has been rarely examined (Doane & Elliot, 2015;
Franks & Scherr, 2014; Gervais, 2014; Ingraham, 2016). There are still states that
require a religious oath for an individual to take political office, and despite the
unconstitutionality of this, an atheist would first have to win elected office in one of these
states to challenge the law. Research indicates the odds are unlikely an atheist would be
viewed positively enough to win office (Franks & Scherr, 2014). This means that 20% of
the population remain largely unrepresented in government and are often unable to seek
or hold office as a result of both individual- and institutional discrimination (Franks &
Scherr, 2014).
Discrimination and prejudicial attitudes toward atheists have largely centered on
the idea that they lack morality, making their trustworthiness suspect (Gervais, 2014;
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Gervais, Shariff, & Norenzayan, 2011). Recent research suggests that trust alone is not
responsible for prejudice and discrimination against atheists. A study comparing
attitudes toward an atheist, African American, and gay male political candidate found that
disgust (typically associated with antigay discrimination) and fear (typically associated
with anti-Black male racism) were greatest toward the atheist candidate (Franks &
Scherr, 2014). While this study compared groups that are known to face discrimination,
no study has yet compared atheist candidates to candidates of major (e.g., Protestant) and
non-mainstream Christian (e.g., Mormon), or non-Christian (e.g., Scientology) religious
groups within the United States (Cragun et al., 2012a; Franks & Scherr, 2014). This
study aims used the same attitude and emotion domains (i.e., distrust, disgust, and fear) to
compare an atheist candidate to candidates from both mainstream and nontraditional
religious backgrounds. The view of mainstream religious groups served as a reference
point in relation to both the atheist and fringe religious (e.g., non-mainstream Christian
and non-Christian) identities and the emotional reactions these identities engender.
Research has not yet determined if a difference exists between fringe groups with
a Christian basis (e.g., Mormons) versus religious groups that have no inherently
Christian foundation (e.g., Scientologists). Scientology was selected for the nonChristian religion as it is well-known, and often viewed as fanatical (Doherty, 2014;
McAllister, 2013; Olson, 2006; Urban, 2012). Mormonism was selected for the fringe
Christian religious identity as it is well known, is viewed as fanatical, and recent studies
suggest Mormons face voter aversion (Penning, 2009; Pew Research Center, 2014;
Smith, 2014). In addition, it was expected that voter preference for a candidate will
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increase for those participants who share a religious ideology with the candidate as
predicted by social identity theory; the greater the difference between the voter and
candidate ideology, the less likely he or she is to vote for the candidate (Ben-Bassat &
Dahan, 2012; Tajfel, 1970). Add to that, the socio-functional approach to prejudice
predicts that the greater the perception of threat based on religious values different from
one’s own, the higher the levels of disgust, distrust, and fear as well as a decrease in voter
intentionality (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). To-date, no research had examined the
relationship between voter preferences and feelings of distrust, disgust, and fear toward
political candidates or how atheist candidates will compare to Christian (e.g., Protestant),
non-mainstream Christian (e.g., Mormon), and non-Christian (e.g., Scientologist)
candidates in terms of voter intentions. Likewise, no studies had yet examined how
similar religious ideologies shared by voter and candidate increases liking and voter
preference for the candidate.
Purpose of the Study
This study assessed attitudes toward atheists and individuals who are members of
traditional and nontraditional religions seeking public office. Franks and Scherr (2014)
suggested that it is unclear whether someone who identifies as a non-mainstream
Christian (e.g., Mormon) or non-Christian (e.g., Scientologist) would face more or less
discrimination than an atheist. Fringe religious movements can be found both within
Christian interpretations and outside (e.g., Mormonism is Christian, while Scientology is
not). As such, it will be important to compare not only the non-Christian fringe
affiliations, but also the non-mainstream Christian group affiliations. It is unclear if
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fringe Christian denominations will be viewed more or less favorably than non-Christian
denominations (Franks & Scherr, 2014; Lalich, 2009). Comparing emotional responses
(i.e., distrust, disgust, and fear) and political acceptance of atheists compared to
mainstream and non-mainstream religious identities is the gap this study addressed.
Research Questions and Hypotheses
Research Question #1: Do atheists face greater discrimination when seeking
political office than candidates who identify as mainstream Christian (Protestant), nonmainstream Christian (Mormon), or non-Christian (Scientologist) as measured by the
voting likelihood scale (Franks & Scherr, 2014)?
Ho1: Atheists do not face greater discrimination when seeking political office
than candidates who identify as mainstream Christian (Protestant), non-mainstream
Christian (Mormon), or non-Christian (Scientologist) as measured by the voting
likelihood scale (Franks & Scherr, 2014).
Ha1: Atheists do face greater discrimination when seeking political office than
candidates who identify as mainstream Christian (Protestant), non-mainstream Christian
(Mormon), or non-Christian (Scientologist) as measured by the voting likelihood scale
(Franks & Scherr, 2014).
Research Question #2: Are participants more likely to vote for a candidate based
on ideological similarity, as predicted by social identity theory and measured by the
voting likelihood scale (Franks and Scherr, 2014)?
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Ho2: Participants are not more likely to vote for a candidate based on ideological
similarity, as predicted by social identity theory and measured by the voting likelihood
scale (Franks & Scherr, 2014).
Ha2: Participants are more likely to vote for a candidate based on ideological
similarity, as predicted by social identity theory and measured by the voting likelihood
scale (Franks & Scherr, 2014).
Research Question #3: Are participants more likely to rate a candidate with lower
levels of trust (higher levels of distrust) when their ideologies are similar, as predicted by
social identity theory and the socio-functional approach, as measured by the 7-point
semantic differential scales (Franks & Scherr, 2014)?
Ho3: Participants will not be more likely to rate a candidate with lower levels of
distrust (higher levels of trust) when their ideologies are similar, as predicted by social
identity theory and the socio-functional approach, as measured by the 7-point semantic
differential scales (Franks & Scherr, 2014).
Ha3: Participants will be more likely to rate a candidate with lower levels of
distrust (higher levels of trust) when their ideologies are similar, as predicted by social
identity theory and the socio-functional approach, as measured by the 7-point semantic
differential scales (Franks & Scherr, 2014).
Research Question #4: Are participants more likely to rate a candidate with lower
levels of disgust when their ideologies are similar, as predicted by social identity theory
and the socio-functional approach, as measured by the 7-point semantic differential scales
(Franks & Scherr, 2014)?
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Ho4: Participants will not be more likely to rate a candidate with lower levels of
disgust when their ideologies are similar, as predicted by social identity theory and the
socio-functional approach, as measured by the 7-point semantic differential scales
(Franks & Scherr, 2014).
Ha4: Participants will be more likely to rate a candidate with lower levels of
disgust when their ideologies are similar, as predicted by social identity theory and the
socio-functional approach, as measured by the 7-point semantic differential scales
(Franks & Scherr, 2014).
Research Question #5: Are participants more likely to rate a candidate with lower
levels of fear when their ideologies are similar, as predicted by social identity theory and
the socio-functional approach, as measured by the 7-point semantic differential scales
(Franks & Scherr, 2014)?
Ho5: Participants will not be more likely to rate a candidate with lower levels of
fear when their ideologies are similar, as predicted by social identity theory and the
socio-functional approach, as measured by the 7-point semantic differential scales
(Franks & Scherr, 2014).
Ha5: Participants will be more likely to rate a candidate with lower levels of fear
when their ideologies are similar, as predicted by social identity theory and the sociofunctional approach, as measured by the 7-point semantic differential scales (Franks &
Scherr, 2014).
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Theoretical Framework
Social psychology studies have long examined prejudice through the lens of
Social Identity Theory. Social Identity Theory posits that personal identity is reflective
of the social groups an individual belongs to, and as such, an individual’s group
membership directly reflects his or her self-concept (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Tajfel &
Turner, 1986). Tajfel (1970) studied minimal and arbitrary differences between group
interactions, and found that an individual will allocate more resources to their own group
(Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Investment in one’s group increases a positive sense of self,
especially when comparisons are made to other groups. This results in ingroup and
outgroup categories, where the outgroup is often a target of ingroup prejudice (Tajfel &
Turner, 1979). However, research also suggests that simple ingroup and outgroup
identities are not enough to explain the complexities of prejudice and discrimination.
Studies that look at anti-atheist prejudice and discrimination typically frame the research
within the socio-functional approach to prejudice, which suggests the affective as well as
behavioral responses that a group elicits from others are a result of perceived threats from
said group (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Gervais, 2013). These threats are different, based
on the outgroup identity of the individual assessed (e.g., fear of Black men, disgust for
gay men, distrust of atheists), and these different threats elicit different forms of prejudice
and discrimination (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Gervais, 2013). As this study focused on
attitudes toward atheists and other minority identities as pertains to voter preferences,
group identity and social identification are appropriate and important for this study. By
assessing emotional responses (e.g., disgust, distrust, and fear) and how these negative
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emotions impact voter preference, the socio-functional approach complements Social
Identity Theory’s assumption that a candidate’s religious similarity is likely to affect
voter intention. Understanding how negative emotions influence minority group
favorability may help underrepresented groups gain political access.
Nature of the Study
This study utilized a quantitative between subjects 2 x 4 experimental design,
with participant religious affiliation similarity (i.e., mainstream Christian, nonmainstream Christian, non-Christian, and atheist) and candidate religious identities (i.e.,
mainstream Christian, non-mainstream Christian, non-Christian, and atheist) as the two
independent variables and voter intention, disgust, distrust, and fear as the dependent
variables. As a result of the four levels of independent variables, it was necessary to
conduct four separate factorial analyses of variance, for each candidate and participant
religious affiliation interaction type. Participants were asked to report the likelihood that
they would vote for a candidate on a scale from 1 (no chance) to 9 (100% likely). Four
political candidates were presented randomly to participants and described as males, each
belonging to a different religious group (Protestant, Scientologist, Mormon, and atheist).
Any identity information that would alter the perception of the candidate (e.g., race,
political party, sexual orientation) has been intentionally left out (e.g., candidate
prioritizes health-care policy, with no emphasis on how he does so). Furthermore,
participants also rated the candidates on three 7-point semantic differential scales,
assessing whether the candidate seemed (a) untrustworthy, (b) threatening or comforting,
and (c) disgusting or appealing with 1 representing untrustworthiness, threatening, and
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disgusting, and 7 representing trustworthiness, comfort, and appeal. This emotional scale
was constructed within the framework of the socio-functional approach to prejudice,
which asserts that individuals ascribe positive emotional values to what he or she deems
as an ingroup (e.g., nationality, religion, race) and negative emotional values to a
threatening outgroup (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). The prejudicial response is
distinctively different based on the emotion that elicited the prejudice be it the perceived
threat to health, values, or physical safety (e.g., fear responses prompt the need to flee;
Cottrell & Neurberg, 2005). This design is similar to the design utilized by Franks and
Scherr (2014) to examine atheist candidates compared to African American and gay male
candidates; whereas, this study compared attitudes toward atheists and individuals who
identify with nontraditional religions.
Definition of Terms
Religion: A system of faith involving hierarchal institutions with organized
practices, beliefs, faith, and worship, typically centered on a belief in a superhuman
controlling power such as a god or gods (Allport, 1950).
Christianity: The organized religious institution based on the person and teachings
of Jesus of Nazareth with structured beliefs and practices as defined by the Bible (Astley,
1992).
Christian: An individual who professes Christianity and its teachings and believes
in Jesus Christ (Astley, 1992).
Protestantism: The faith, practice, and churches that are forms of the Christian
doctrine that are regarded as Protestant rather than Catholic or Eastern Orthodox; these
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Western Christian churches follow the principles of the Reformation and include Baptist,
Presbyterian, and Lutheran churches (Astley, 1992).
Protestant: A member or follower of the Western Christian Protestant churches
(Astley, 1992).
Scientology: A religious system founded by L. Ron Hubbard in the 1950s
requiring spiritual fulfillment be met through graded courses of study and training;
Scientology is the belief that each human has a reactive mind that responds to life
traumas, clouding the analytic mind and keeping humans from experiencing reality
(Christensen, 2016; Urban, 2012).
Scientologist: Adherents of the Church of Scientology doctrines and practices
(Christensen, 2016; Urban, 2012).
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS): Founded in 1830 by
Joseph Smith, a Christian restoration church that is considered by its members to be a
restoration of the original church founded by Jesus Christ (Smith, 2016).
Mormon: Members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Smith,
2016).
Atheist: A person who lacks belief in the existence of a god or gods or disbelieves
entirely (Gervais, 2013).
Fringe Religion: Not part of the mainstream religious practices; an
unconventional, peripheral, or extreme take on existing religious practices and groups
(Olson, 2006).
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Cult: A relatively small group of people having religious beliefs or practices
regarded by others as strange or sinister; typically a system of religious veneration and
devotion directed toward a particular figure or object (Richardson, 1993).
Cult (As Pejorative): An insult used to demean smaller or more unusual religious
practices that may not academically fit the definition of a cult, but are considered strange
to the general public (Olson, 2006).
Assumptions
There are aspects of this study that are believed to be true but cannot be
demonstrated to be true, and therefore must be presented as assumptions to ensure the
integrity of the study findings. It is assumed that participants responded to the survey
questions honestly. While social desirability bias is always a possibility in self-report
measures, anonymity and the ability to withdraw from the study at any time are
preventive measures taken to minimize this and increase participant confidence.
Furthermore, participants were also provided a statement of the importance of the study
and its purpose, and the necessity of participants’ accurate and honest responses. It is
also assumed that participants whom elected to participate in this study can read English,
are U.S. citizens, are of legal age, and of sound mind, and thus capable of navigating the
study. A consent page was presented prior to the participant beginning the study in order
to minimize participants accessing the study who should not participate in the study.
Furthermore, it is assumed that participants have some basic computer skills and
understanding of navigating webpages. The survey was designed in a simple and user-
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friendly format in order to minimize errors during the survey process as a result of
computer application skills.
Scope and Delimitations
The research questions address anti-atheist prejudice in a political setting and
participants’ emotional reactions to atheist candidates. This specific focus was chosen in
order to expand upon the current literature and work towards alleviating atheist
underrepresentation in political office. The comparative electability of atheists with
nontraditional religious candidates had yet to be examined (Franks & Scherr, 2014).
Existing studies on anti-atheist prejudice and atheists in a political setting have
documented negative attitudes and distrust toward atheists and a low likelihood of
participants voting for atheist candidates compared to other historically discriminated
against groups (e.g., Black men and gay men) who were still Christian (Franks & Scherr,
2014; Gervais, 2013; Gervais, 2014; Gervais et al., 2011).
This study was limited to respondents online who are U.S. citizens of legal voting
age, capable of reading English, and find the survey through Survey Monkey advertising
and hosting services and social media site (i.e., Reddit and Facebook). However, while
generalizability may be limited as a result of online hosting, demographic data was
collected to ensure the variability of the sample.
The Socio-functional Approach to Prejudice and Social Identity Theory have been
selected as the most appropriate framework for the proposed study. To date, nearly all
anti-atheist prejudice research is grounded in these two theories; however studies
examining the clinical ramifications for atheist identification (e.g., depression) have
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examined atheist identity through the lens of concealable stigmatized identity theory and
the consequences of belonging to a group that an individual may feel pressure to hide
(Cragun, Kosmin, Keysar, Hammer, & Nielsen, 2012b; Doane & Elliot, 2015; Johnson,
Rowatt, & LaBouff, 2012; Quinn & Chaudoir, 2009). Furthermore, some research
examining cult perceptions utilized framing theory in order to examine how word and
phrase changes altered perceptions of the same process for different groups (Pfeifer,
1992). While each offers important insight into atheist and group identity, both were
beyond the scope of the proposed study.
Limitations
One major limitation of this study is the nonrandom sampling method. As the
survey will be hosted online, this convenience sampling method can limit the
generalizability of the study. In addition to meeting the criteria for inclusion, this could
limit the diversity of the sample as well as unintentionally exclude individuals from low
socioeconomic backgrounds who may not have Internet access. Another limitation of
this study is the use of a between-groups design rather than a within-groups design.
While it is not feasible to require participants to examine four separate candidates
described identically except for religious identity, it does present a limitation as each
respondent only viewed a single candidate option.
Significance of the Study
Although some studies have provided information about why individuals
discriminate against atheists, very little research exists on prejudice toward atheists by
voters (Franks & Scherr, 2014; Gervais, 2014; Gervais et al., 2011). Expecting that
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voters prefer candidates with similar religious ideologies, this study not only adds to the
literature on (a) anti-atheist prejudice but on (b) the impact of shared religious identity on
voter preference. By advancing the literature on atheists and politics, perhaps gains can
be made toward addressing their underrepresentation in elected office. Gaining political
representation would allow historically underrepresented groups to better combat
institutionalized discrimination that affects their interests (Franks & Scherr, 2014). For
atheists this includes maintaining the separation of church and state and keeping politics
more secularly inclusive rather than favoring Christianity. Examples of this favoritism
include laws passed or changed solely based on Christian values (e.g., Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby, 573 U.S), states that prevent atheists from holding public office, and public office
meetings beginning with Christian specific invocations, while excluding other religions
or nonreligious individuals (American Civil Liberties Union, 2017; McElfresh, 2016;
Mehta, 2016; Richer, 2017; Sager, 2014). Furthermore, if atheists were able to gain
access to public office, attention could be called to the common forms of discrimination
atheists face on a daily basis to prevent hiring and workplace discrimination (Gervais,
Shariff, & Norenzayan, 2011; Wallace et al., 2014). Atheist politicians could also hold
judges accountable for custodial case discrimination of atheist parents versus Christian
parents (Volokh, 2006). Without equal representation, prejudicial and discriminatory
practices against atheists largely stay under the radar and will continue to go unlegislated.
Summary
This quantitative study examined the comparative electability of atheists to
candidates of other nontraditional religious identities as well as the emotional responses
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these candidates elicit. Distrust of atheists and the belief that atheists lack morals have
been well-documented, but only a single study has examined anti-atheist prejudice in a
political setting (Franks & Scherr, 2014; Gervais, 2014; Gervais, Shariff, & Norenzayan,
2011). This study expands on those findings, comparing atheists to nontraditional
religious identities rather than historically marginalized groups such as Black men and
gay men (Franks & Scherr, 2014). Voter intention and participant disgust, distrust, and
fear toward the candidates were measured to determine the extent to which various
religious identities are viewed negatively.
Chapter 2 provides a comprehensive review of the literature, including seminal
and contemporary research. The gaps within the literature were examined and
implications of the literature presented are discussed as is the theoretical foundation. A
literature review related to key variables is also provided.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Introduction
Atheists in the United States are underrepresented in public office. For example,
in the 115th Congress only a single member of Congress identified as unaffiliated, and no
members identified as openly atheist (Sandstrom, 2017). In contrast, 91% identified as
Christian, while the total United States population is only 70% Christian (Pew Research
Center, 2014a; Sandstrom, 2017). The population of individuals identifying as atheist in
the United States has more than doubled in the last few years, with 3.1% of Americans
identifying as atheist on the 2014 Religious Landscape Study, up from 1.6% in 2007
(Ingraham, 2016; Lipka, 2016a). This underrepresentation is difficult to overcome with
pervasive negative perceptions of and prejudice toward atheists. To demonstrate the
unelectability of atheist political candidates, the aim for the study was to show (a)
perceived atheist threat elicits negative emotional response and (b) atheists are more
reviled than even the most historically reviled groups. This may account for atheist
underrepresentation in political office.
Several studies have been conducted to examine anti-atheist prejudice, finding
that atheists are distrusted, viewed as arrogant, immoral, associated with anti-American
sentiments, and are most likely not to be accepted, both publicly and privately, when
compared to almost any other ethnic and religious group studied (Edgell, Gerteis, &
Hartmann, 2006; Franks & Scherr, 2014; Gervais, 2014; Gervais, Shariff, & Norenzayan,
2011). The majority of Americans (77% of white evangelicals, 67% of Black Protestants,
55% of Catholics, and 46% of white mainline Protestants) would be unhappy if an atheist
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were to marry into the family (Lipka & Martinez, 2014). Surveys suggest there is greater
acceptance of individuals marrying across party lines, despite high levels of polarization
in the current political environment, than there is of individuals who are religious
marrying those who are not (Lipka & Martinez, 2014).
This prejudice also extends to the political sphere; however, little research has
been done to examine reasons for atheist underrepresentation in political office despite
polls indicating that most Americans find atheist candidates less electable than candidates
with traditional religious affiliations (e.g., Jewish, Catholic, Baptist; Jones, 2012; Pew
Research Center, 2014a). Examples of anti-atheist prejudice include comments made by
political candidates about atheists as well as actions taken toward atheists in the public
sphere. In 2015, United States presidential candidate Ted Cruz remarked that atheists
were not fit to be president, as a president must be willing to start his day with prayer and
submit to the King, Jesus Christ (Wing, 2015). Cecil Bothwell, an atheist elected to
public office in Asheville, North Carolina, had to defend his election after opponents
challenged the constitutionality of his holding political office, solely on the grounds of
his atheism and because he took his oath of office on the Constitution instead of the Bible
(Zucchino, 2009). Despite federal laws making it illegal to require a religious test for
public office, seven states still officially have laws on the books barring atheists from
office (Franks & Scherr, 2014). Furthermore, in Arkansas a woman running for a seat on
the board of education is the target of slander campaigns based solely on the fact she is an
atheist and who opposed a local school that violated the First Amendment by inviting a
Catholic nun to bless the school’s new fitness trail (Mehta, 2017). Facebook founder
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Mark Zuckerberg had previously listed his religious affiliation as atheist, but recently
changed this stance to “believing religion is important,” with many analysts speculating a
public office run in the near future, and open identification as an atheist is considered
“political suicide” (Ohlheiser, 2017; Zauzmer, 2016).
Policies that limit atheists’ access to public office or their right to live a secular
lifestyle do not likewise apply to Christians. This includes the seven states that currently
ban atheists from holding public office, as well as the government demonstrating
preferential treatment to Christianity and its symbols (Faircloth, 2012; Ferber, 2009;
Ferber, 2012; Franks & Scherr, 2014; Stack, 2016; Steinberg & Kincheloe, 2008). For
example, Christian icons and symbols are frequently found in public and government
places, such as the use of the Bible to swear in on for court testimony, references to God
on the currency and in the pledge, or nativity scenes and the monuments of the Ten
Commandments placed in government buildings, while also denying other religious or
secular displays until court intervention occurs (Getto & Harjai, 2015; Schwers, 2015).
Furthermore, churches are granted tax exempt status, while also being granted tax
funding for various projects (Goodstein, 2014; Moyer, 2017; Totenberg, 2017).
Examples of Christian privilege in politics abound, including the use of public school
funds for religious schools through vouchers, tax-breaks in the form of faith-based
incentives, and legislation prioritizing Christian values (e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby,
573 U.S.). Atheist underrepresentation makes it difficult to maintain a secular
government for all citizens, regardless of religious affiliation.
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A study conducted in the South eastern United States to evaluate religious
discrimination in the workplace, sent out 3,200 fictitious resumes to employers with each
resume assigned one of seven religious affiliations: atheist, Catholic, evangelical
Christian, Jewish, Muslim, pagan, Wallonian (a fictitious religion created for the purpose
of the study) and a control group with no mention of religious affiliation (Wallace,
Wright, & Hyde, 2014). Candidates who mentioned any religious affiliation received
20% fewer phone calls and 33% fewer emails than the control group. Researchers
believed this may be because overt religious affiliations in the workplace may present
conflict. However, atheists faced considerable challenges from employers, with 49%
fewer emails and 43% fewer phone calls than the control group and were ranked lower
than the pagan or fictitious religion, as well as rating second to last on the employer
preference scale, nearly matching the least preferred Muslims (Wallace et al., 2014). In
addition to this form of hiring discrimination Gervais (Gervais et al., 2011) found that
atheists face hiring discrimination in all high trust domain job roles, such as day care
providers.
While the Constitution guarantees freedom of religion, many in the United States
do not believe this includes freedom from religion. The American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU) often fights cases related to unjust treatment of atheists and the preferential
treatment of Christians by the government. Examples include (a) religious booths or
decorations placed in government buildings while similar secular booths or decorations
are rejected (e.g., Warren, Michigan City Hall); (b) cases in which the government
allows public funding to church groups (e.g., Trinity Lutheran v. Comer); (c) cases where
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atheist school children have been removed from class or shamed for not saying God in
the pledge (e.g., Acadiana High School; Lafayette, Louisiana); (d) as well as government
sponsored Christian prayer in public assembly meetings, forcing the public to participate
(e.g., Rowan County, North Carolina prayer practices; American Civil Liberties Union,
2017; McElfresh, 2016; Mehta, 2016; Richer, 2017; Sager, 2014).
Other examples of atheists denied equal protection under the law include child
custody cases in which a parent participating in a church is granted custody over an
atheist parent, because the judge rules that religion is for the greater good of the child
(Stafford, 2010). One case in New Mexico required a mother to attend religious
counseling in order to gain custody of her children. When she complained to the court
about the religious overtones of the sessions, nothing was done, and she quit going.
Being held in contempt of court, her children were removed from her care for four weeks,
and she was forced to attend the sessions to regain custody of her children. The mother’s
sessions included handouts with Biblical scripture and homework assignments forcing the
atheist to write “what is God to me” (Holland, 2015). As punishment, this atheist mother
was forced into Christian indoctrination to retain custody of her children. Recently
brought to national attention, the first bill offering protection to atheists was signed by
President Obama in December of 2016 (Beres, 2017; Johnson, 2016; United States
Congress, 2016). This bill was amended and passed as a moral stance against the
persecution of atheist writers and cartoonists, particularly in Middle Eastern countries.
This bill also recognizes prejudice-based crimes, granting atheists and the nonreligious a
protected class status (Beres, 2017; Johnson, 2016; United States Congress, 2016). A
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great deal of lobbying took place on the part of atheist activist groups to ensure their
inclusion in this bill. Greater political representation of atheists may alleviate some of
the legal issues, namely their lack of protections, as it would give atheists some
legislative power.
As a result of pervasive negative perceptions of atheists, it is difficult for many of
them to openly identify as atheist. Many atheists remain “in the closet” to avoid the
stigma, prejudice, and discrimination associated with atheist identification (Doane &
Elliot, 2015; Johnson, Rowatt, & LaBouff, 2012). However, while open atheists do
report experiencing prejudice and discrimination, individuals who choose to hide their
identity report even greater levels of negative well-being as a result of this identity
conflict (Cragun et al., 2012b; Doane & Elliot, 2015; Quinn & Chaudoir, 2009).
Typically, minority groups that face prejudice from the majority (e.g., Blacks, gays,
Muslims, etc.) face more intense and more prevalent prejudice as the group grows in size.
For example, as Americans view larger numbers of Muslims coming to the United States,
Muslim individuals face more prejudice that is more intense in nature, and larger
numbers of Muslims per capita report experiencing prejudice (Gervais, 2011). However,
atheists are the opposite; research suggests people are more prejudiced toward atheists in
part because they believe them to be such a small group relative to the general population
(Gervais, 2011). In recent years, the LGBT community has gained more mainstream
public acceptance, while atheists have not (Franks & Scherr, 2014; Harms, 2011).
Research suggests that greater exposure to atheists minimizes prejudice toward atheists,
meaning more open atheist political candidates may also contribute to more atheists
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feeling safe and comfortable in identifying themselves as such, possibly allowing atheists
to gain acceptance the same way the LGBT community has been (Gervais, 2011; Harms,
2011). Because of this, atheist views and ideas are thought to be outliers. However,
when people perceive greater numbers of atheists around them, prejudice and implicit
distrust toward atheists decreases suggesting that open atheist identification and greater
representation in office may minimize anti-atheist prejudice (Gervais, 2011). In order to
address this problem, a greater understanding of the specific prejudice atheists face is
needed to resolve their comparative unelectability.
Current Literature and the Relevance of the Problem
Though research on anti-atheist prejudice has increased over the last decade, it is
still sparse. The studies that have been done find that anti-atheist prejudice is associated
mainly with distrust (Gervais, 2013; Gervais, 2014; Gervais et al., 2011). Specifically, it
is believed by many in the U.S. that morality derives from a higher power, and without
answering to this higher power people lack morals (Gervais, 2013; Gervais, 2014;
Gervais et al., 2011). This interpretation of morality causes individuals to view it as a
fixed value, where the Bible defines right and wrong in absolute terms. As atheists do
not have religious “rules” to adhere to, the atheist, therefore, cannot have morals,
meaning nothing is stopping him or her from committing all manner of crimes (Gervais,
2013; Gervais, 2014; Gervais et al., 2011). This leads to the conclusion that without
morals, atheists are more likely to be criminals and engage in morally repugnant
behavior, resulting in the inability to trust them (Gervais, 2013; Gervais, 2014; Gervais et
al., 2011).
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These findings were expanded when a study by Franks and Scherr (2014)
examined more than just distrust toward atheists but also disgust and fear, and found that
atheist political candidates were viewed with more disgust and fear than were candidates
belonging to groups that face discrimination typically associated with these emotions
(e.g., Black males and gay males). Furthermore, the likelihood participants would vote
for the atheist candidate compared to a Black male candidate or the gay male candidate
was measured, and participants were less likely to vote for the atheist candidate when
compared to these candidates representing groups that are historically discriminated
against (Franks & Scherr, 2014). However, the focus of the Franks and Scherr (2014)
study was on comparing atheists to either the majority religious group (e.g., Christians) or
historically marginalized groups (e.g., Black males and gay males). Only one study has
compared atheists and the nontraditionally religious (e.g., cultists, with no real-world
religious label) in any fashion (e.g., Cragun et al., 2012a), and no study has compared
these groups in a political setting.
Research suggests that the only social or religious groups that may be more
reviled than atheists are cults (Cragun et al., 2012a; Lalich, 2009; Olson, 2006). As such,
the use of cult groups may serve as a useful metric for determining the extent to which
the general public dislikes atheists. The aforementioned study did not compare atheists
and cultists in a political setting, and furthermore did not use any specific religious label
to compare atheists to cultists (Cragun et al., 2012a). Instead the study assessed atheists
versus “cultists,” using the cultist label specifically. Research has not yet determined the
comparative electability of atheists with religions historically at odds with mainstream
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values (e.g., Mormons and Scientologists both viewed as fanatical). Determining
whether atheists engender feelings of fear, distrust, and disgust and are more or less
electable than historically unelectable political candidates (i.e., Mormons and
Scientologists) is important in terms of the potential for atheist representation in political
office (Doherty, 2014; Grieg, 2017; Harrison, 2015; McAllister, 2013; Olson, 2006;
Penning, 2009; Pew Research Center, 2014a; Smith, 2014; Urban, 2012).
Preview of Major Sections of the Chapter
This chapter outlines the literature to-date regarding anti-atheist prejudice as well
as the literature assessing the consequences of such prejudice for the atheist population,
especially insofar as political underrepresentation is concerned. Social Identity Theory
and the socio-functional approach to prejudice will be discussed, including not only the
types of research that have been done within each framework, but also the relevance of
each theory to the proposed study. The literature related to the key variables are
reviewed, including studies that have identified the range of negative emotions
underlying anti-atheist prejudice and the implications for atheists seeking political office
is discussed. Nontraditional religious affiliations, cult identity, atheist identity, and how
the public perceive these groups are discussed. The gaps within the literature are
identified as is the significance of the proposed study.
Literature Search Strategy
Conducting an extensive review of the literature to assess key areas for future
research and gain an understanding of the problem was necessary and possible through
the use of the Walden University Library and Google Scholar. Databases used during
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this review include: Academic Search Complete, Annual Reviews, LexisNexis
Academic, ProQuest Central, PsycARTICLES, PsycINFO, SAGE Premier,
ScienceDirect, SocINDEX, and Taylor & Francis. Books containing pertinent
information about research methods and theory were purchased and reviewed, and
articles referenced within the books were investigated. The American Psychological
Association database PsycNET was also utilized. Data on political representation and
religious populations within the United States were obtained from Pew Research Center’s
Religious Landscape Study and was especially helpful in establishing empirical support
for the relevance of this study.
Search terms included the following: religious discrimination, anti-atheist
prejudice, discrimination, prejudice, socio-functional approach, social identity, cults, cult
perceptions, religious identity, atheism, intergroup prejudice, intergroup dynamics,
intergroup threats, intergroup emotions, voter attitudes, stereotyping, values threat,
threat perceptions, religiosity, fringe religious groups, fringe Christian groups,
Scientology, perceptions of Mormons, Mormonism, Catholicism, Protestantism, Muslims,
government, emotional reactions, emotional responses, religious denominations,
attitudes, morality, political discrimination, and factorial research design.
The literature dealing with prejudicial attitudes is extensive, including the seminal
work on Social Identity Theory and the socio-functional approach (Cottrell & Neuberg,
2005; Tajfel, 1970; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). In addition to articles on theoretical
approaches to prejudice, an investigation of attitudes toward religious and nonreligious
individuals was conducted. The empirical work of preeminent authors on anti-atheist
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prejudice includes research from Will Gervais (2011, 2013, 2014), Ritter and Preston
(2011), and Cook, Cottrell, and Webster (2015). Research on other forms of religious
prejudice and discrimination in order to establish context as well as the prevalence of the
problem is also discussed (e.g., Dunkel & Dutton, 2016; Johnson, Rowatt, & Labouff,
2010; Mikołajczak, & Pietrzak, 2014). Research utilizing the socio-functional approach
to prejudice to compare atheist political candidates to historically marginalized groups is
also discussed (Franks & Scherr, 2014), as well as pertinent information regarding the
perceptions of Americans to cult and fringe religious groups (Cragun et al., 2012a;
Urban, 2012; Olson, 2006).
Theoretical Foundation
The Socio-functional Approach to Prejudice
Despite numerous types of stereotypes that prompt prejudice and discrimination,
traditional theories and approaches to prejudice only analyze negative feelings as an
aggregate and their intensity exhibited toward a group and its members (Cottrell &
Neuberg, 2005; Gervais, 2011). However, until recently, researchers have not focused on
the range of emotions, both positive and negative, associated with prejudice (e.g., anger,
fear, disgust, pity, admiration, guilt, etc.). This diversity of emotion was first noted by
Allport (1954). While Katz (1960) suggested attitudes serve a specific function (e.g.,
adjustment, ego-defensive, value-expressive, and knowledge functions), as well as
discussing attitude arousal on the basis of threats (e.g., ego-defensive attitudes are
aroused by threats, appeals to hatred, repressed impulses, and authoritarian suggestions),
the theory was never used in the context of specific emotions for specific types of
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stereotyping or prejudice. As such, the emotional range associated with prejudice was
not examined and conceptualized into a workable theory until Cottrell and Neuberg
(2005) established the socio-functional approach to prejudice studies. The assumption
was that if individuals have distinct beliefs regarding different groups, the distinct
feelings associated with those beliefs may provide greater context and understanding of
prejudice (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005).
The socio-functional approach to prejudice posits that researchers must first
understand the unique threats posed before understanding the prejudice against that group
(Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). Prejudice is typically linked to the perception of a threat,
and each threat perception correlates to a specific emotional response. Perceived threats
to security and safety elicit the emotional response of fear, whereas threats to physical
(e.g., food poisoning) or moral contamination (e.g., sexual liberation versus abstinence
before marriage) elicit the emotional response of disgust (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005).
These visceral emotions each present differently (e.g., facial expressions, neurological
processes, and physiologic patterns) and as such has distinct correlated behavior (Cottrell
& Neuberg, 2005). Examining these emotions, researchers have found that priming
individuals with the emotion relative to a specific group (e.g., disgust toward gays, anger
toward Arabs) increased implicit bias toward those groups (Dasgupta, DeSteno,
Williams, & Hunsinger, 2009). Studies utilizing the socio-functional approach to
prejudice have typically associated a single perceived threat and correlated emotional
response to a group facing prejudice (see: Cook, Li, Newell, Cottrell, & Neel, 2016;
Levin et al., 2016; Levin, Kteily, Pratto, Sidanius, & Matthews, 2013). The proposed
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study hypothesizes that participants will exhibit greater levels of disgust, distrust, and
fear toward atheist political candidates than toward other nontraditional religious groups
that are typically considered at odds with mainstream American values (e.g.,
Scientologists and Mormons). As a result of these negative emotions and the associated
threats many believe atheists pose, the electability of atheists is called into question,
resulting in political underrepresentation of atheists at local, state, and federal levels of
government.
A series of experiments conducted by Cottrell and Neuberg (2005) to assess how
specific threat perceptions (real or imagined threats to safety, values, etc.) about a group
(e.g., Blacks, Muslims, gays, etc.) in relation to the stereotypes typically associated with
the group (e.g., unintelligent, lazy, poor, criminal, etc.) would cause the individual to feel.
The study noted that fear toward Black men, as a result of media images that often prime
criminality, was associated with a perceived threat to safety. This means that the type of
threat perceived (e.g., fear) by the majority ingroup (e.g., Whites) from the minority
outgroup (e.g., Blacks) engenders a prejudicial response reflected by the subsequent
behavior (e.g., fear responses elicit the tendency to flee). An emotional response to a
group perceived to be a moral threat (e.g., disgust), might prompt the expulsion of the
contaminated idea or object (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). While activist feminists,
African Americans, and fundamentalist Christians were all viewed as threats in the
Cottrell and Neuberg (2005) study, the type of threat each group posed was different, and
the extent to which each group faced prejudice, the types of emotions, and types of
stereotypes related to each group were significantly different (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005).
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The specificity of emotions related to threat perceptions and prejudice allows for precise
examination of prejudice in the context of a given group, while traditional measures of
prejudice are too general and ignore how prejudice is activated. By examining threat to
emotion activations by prejudice, a greater understanding of the degree to which atheists
are viewed negatively can be achieved. Furthermore, this understanding may contribute
to ameliorating the problem of atheist unelectability.
It was expected that this study would also have similar findings to Cottrell and
Neuberg (2005), where group affiliation elicits different emotional reactions and levels of
intensity among participants. For example, studies examining perceptions of Muslims
find people are typically angry toward Muslims and fearful of them, and these emotions
are related to threats to personal security (fear) and personal resources (anger). Atheists
on the other hand are viewed as a moral contaminant, therefore disgusting and cannot be
trusted (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Kuppens & Yzerbyt, 2012; Matthews & Levin, 2012).
It is currently unclear how Scientologists and Mormons will be perceived.
Utilizing the socio-functional approach to prejudice, distrust has been found to be
a core feature of anti-atheist bias (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2007; Gervais, Shariff, &
Norenzayan, 2011). Research suggests atheists are distrusted in part because they do not
adhere to a structured religious practice or dogma and, consequently, perceived to lack
cooperation and morality which undermines the social order (Franks & Scherr, 2014).
Gervais, Shariff, and Norenzayan (2011) found that participants who reported distrusting
atheists not only believe in God but also believe that God is watching their behavior,
resulting not only in the participant feeling mindful of their actions, but also believing

33
atheists are not mindful of their actions because they lack this belief (Gervais et al.,
2011). While belief in God correlated with greater levels of distrust of atheists, liberal
and secular groups in the U.S. were also found to distrust atheists (Gervais et al., 2011).
Findings show atheists were socially excluded from high-trust domains (e.g., daycare
worker) while a description of a criminally untrustworthy individual (e.g., damaging
property, stealing) was assumed to be either an atheist or a rapist but not a Christian,
Muslim, Jew, feminist, or homosexual (Gervais et al., 2011).
The study was limited to the U.S., which is predominately Christian. A recent
study looked at global distrust by examining 13 countries including majority-Buddhist,
Christian, Hindu, Muslim, and nonreligious countries. The experiment utilized the
conjunction fallacy, where participants are asked which group is more likely to commit a
specific act, and even in highly secular countries (e.g., Netherlands, Czech Republic,
Finland, China), participants intuitively judged atheists less trustworthy and more likely
to commit immoral acts (Gervais et al., 2017). Even atheists tend to judge other atheists
as distrustful, suggesting that anti-atheist prejudice is globally widespread (Gervais et al.,
2017). These findings suggest that people perceive religion and belief in a god as
necessary for morality, trust, and prosociality to exist in individuals (Gervais et al., 2017;
Neuberg et al., 2014).
Franks and Scherr (2014) utilized the socio-functional approach and the previous
research relating distrust to atheist prejudice in order to not only examine anti-atheist
prejudice in a political setting but also to examine other emotions related to different
types of prejudice. Specifically, Franks and Scherr (2014) sought to examine the two
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emotions most commonly connected to bias and prejudice toward two of the most
historically discriminated against groups in the United States, Black men and gay men.
Fear is predominately responsible for prejudice toward Black men, particularly as a result
of media priming that presents Black men as criminal, and disgust largely governs the
prejudice toward gay men, as it is considered a threat to values and morals. Each of these
emotions, connected to prejudice within the framework, stems from unique threats these
groups are perceived to pose to the White, heterosexual, Christian majority in the US
(Franks & Scherr, 2014; Schaller & Neuberg, 2012). Appraisals of threats are linked to
specific emotions, e.g., a threat to physical safety would elicit fear, a threat to personal
rights and freedoms would elicit anger, and a threat to group value and morality would
elicit feelings of disgust (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). The study found that not only were
atheist candidates more distrusted (as was predicted based on prior findings) than Black
male and gay male candidates, but atheists were also considered more disgusting and
participants were more afraid of the atheist candidate as well (Franks & Scherr, 2014).
To contrast the high levels of distrust associated with atheists, many political candidates
emphasize their traditional religious values, which may be an attempt to enhance public
perception of the candidate’s morality and elicit trust (Clifford & Gaskins, 2016).
Utilizing the socio-functional approach in a political setting allows researchers to get a
glimpse into the emotional prejudices that influence voter preference.
Following the Franks and Scherr (2014) study that established atheists in a
political setting were targets of more than a single negative prejudicial emotion, Cook,
Cottrell, and Webster (2015) found atheists were perceived as a greater threat to values
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and elicited a stronger reaction of moral disgust than other groups such as gay men and
Muslims. Primed with stories of moral decline, the experimental group was presented
with a narrative of current college students not valuing traditional values such as loyalty
and fidelity as well as greater instances of students lying and cheating than in past years
(Cook et al., 2015). The individuals primed with threat-to-values stories showed an
increase in prejudicial attitudes and discriminatory intentions toward atheists (Cook et al.,
2015). This finding is in line with previous research finding that high levels of distrust
toward atheists relates to the belief that atheists lack cooperation and undermine the
social order (Cook et al., 2015; Franks & Scherr, 2014; Gervais et al., 2011). Examining
the comparative electability of atheists and nontraditional religious candidates provided
new data for each group, specifically in a political setting, and may provide insight into
improving the electability of atheists by understanding the context of the prejudice
atheists face and to what extent the prejudice is exhibited relative to other reviled
religious groups.
Social Identity Theory
Social Identity Theory (SIT) suggests people identify themselves in relation to the
groups they belong to (Tajfel, 1974; Tajfel, 1979; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). This means
that an individual’s family and relationships, vocation and hobbies, religious and political
affiliations, social and economic class, gender, and race are all groups that define the
person’s self-identity. Which identity is most accessible to an individual will vary based
on the specific situation he or she is in (Yakushko, Davidson, & Williams, 2009). For
example, religious icons displayed publically may remind an individual of his or her
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religious identity while the national anthem is a reminder of national identity. This can
also occur and even be heightened when an individual’s identity is threatened by conflict
with another group (e.g., gender roles, racial identity, role of authority, religious
identities, etc.). Threats to individual identity can become especially volatile when
threatened or disrespected (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). For example, in the United States,
the majority of individuals (70%) belong to some form of Christian church (Pew
Research Center, 2014). If an atheist is open about his or her identity, a perceived threat
may be experienced by both the Christian and the atheist, as each will perceive
challenges to their self-identity, pride, and self-esteem (Cowgill, Rios, & Simpson, 2017;
Edgell, Gerteis, & Hartmann, 2006; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). As individuals tend to view
themselves in a positive light, they also tend to view the groups they belong to in an
equally positive light (Cialdini et al., 1976; Cialdini & Richardson, 1980). Individuals
may view themselves positively based on the accomplishments of their group (even if
they did not contribute directly to these accomplishments). They may also attempt to
enhance the status of their group through involvement in it, such as proselytizing a
specific religious faith (Tajfel & Turner, 1986).
Tajfel and Turner (1979) proposed that individuals evaluate others utilizing three
mental processes: (1) categorization (i.e., individuals categorize people and objects to
organize the social environment), (2) social identification (i.e., individuals adopt the
identity of the group to which they belong), and (3) social comparison (i.e., individuals
compare their groups to others). Categorization is a natural mental process that allows
the person to quickly understand the world around them by evaluating people based on
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their group identities (e.g., a man versus a woman). This enhances the individual’s sense
of safety as the person associates a specific group (e.g., police) with a specific trait (e.g.,
safety). However, as categorization exaggerates differences between groups and
minimizes differences within groups (e.g., people often see the outgroup as more
homogenous than the ingroup, making it easy to assert “they are all alike”), this presents
the danger of stereotyping and prejudice (Tajfel, 1981). Viewing a group as monolithic
(e.g., atheists all lack morals) makes it likely all individuals in that group are judged the
same regardless of individual differences. Once stereotypes become established as a
cognitive representation of a group, it is difficult to alter these perceptions. These
perceptions influence individual judgments and thereby influence beliefs and emotions
that lead to prejudicial views. The expectation prior to data collection was that
underlying stereotypes and prejudicial feelings may disincline participants to vote for that
candidate. Specifically, it was expected participants will be more likely to vote for
candidates with similar versus dissimilar identities.
Social identity, while able to promote self-esteem, prosociality, and societal
cooperation, also produces religious and political tribalism, meaning that individuals will
rigidly defend and support their group simply because they belong to it (Simpson, 2006).
For example, the Democratic Party platform presents many issues that, for many
Democrats, are not necessarily ideologically consistent. An individual’s stance on trade
does not decide his or her stance on immigration or abortion. However, despite members
potentially disagreeing with specifics of the platform, and having little in common with
other members, individuals will coalesce around their party’s platform which they view
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as far superior to the Republican Party platform (Baldassarri & Gelman, 2008; Fiorina &
Abrams, 2008; Ornstein, 2014).
As groups may compete with one another for status (e.g., the winning political
party of a presidential election) or resources (e.g., the number of people belonging to a
church in a single community), prejudice can arise that fuels polarization (i.e., division
into sharply contrasting groups with opposing ideologies) and eventually tribalism
(Levine, Prosser, Evans, & Reicher, 2005). While tribalism (i.e., behavior and attitudes
that stem from strong loyalty to one's own social group or “tribe”) benefits the ingroup, it
can also mean that group members (a) fail to question their group’s doctrine when
warranted and (b) staunchly oppose their group’s foes even when not warranted.
Tribalism is prominent in the current political environment, with Democrats and
Republicans supporting their respective party at all costs, regardless of legislative beliefs
or gains (Baldassarri & Gelman, 2008; Fiorina & Abrams, 2008; Ornstein, 2014).
This tribalism of the current environment also extends to religious identification,
as the Republican Party is strongly linked to and identifies as evangelical Christian
(Lipka, 2016b). One need only examine media coverage from conservative news outlets
during Democratic President Obama’s administration to see how often he was painted as
“other,” by suggesting he was a Kenya-born Muslim (Gore, 2017). One-third of
conservatives and 17% of Americans believed Barack Obama to be a Muslim, while
many conservatives also believed he was an anti-American immigrant from Africa (Gore,
2017). This type of tribalism was examined in a study assessing participant reactions to
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various target subject identities, based on which identity had been made more salient at
the time (Kuppens & Yzerbyt, 2012).
Kuppens and Yzerbyt (2012) presented female Muslim subjects for Western
female participants to examine, with the predominate social identity varying for each
subject (e.g., Muslim woman, student, young adult). In groups where the subject was
presented as a Muslim woman, female participants felt greater levels of disgust, fear, and
anger. However, when the same subject (Muslim woman) was presented as a student or
young adult, with no emphasis on her religious identity, these emotions were not nearly
as frequent or as strong (Kuppens & Yzerbyt, 2012). It is believed the reason for the
reaction is that the combined identity of Muslim woman elicits a threat reaction in
Western women related to the fear of physical harm (because of Islamic terrorism),
threats to personal rights and freedoms (e.g., Sharia law in majority Muslim countries),
and threats to group values and morality (e.g., religious and ideological differences
related to women’s rights). The study provided evidence of how identity salience affects
the emotional response of participant observers when the acknowledged identity of a
target subject threatens a social identity of the participant (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005;
Kuppens & Yzerbyt, 2012). This could have political implications for atheists, if atheist
candidates can understate the atheist identity and instead foreground political party or
national identity that resonates with the majority of voters.
According to Seul (1999) religious group conflict is well-explained through the
use of Social Identity Theory for many reasons. First, a great deal more of an
individual’s psychological needs and cultural meaning are met by their religious group
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affiliation (e.g., cosmology, moral frameworks, institutional organization, rituals,
traditions, etc.). With much of an individual’s identity tied to religious group affiliation,
it stands to reason that intergroup conflict would be common across religious groups,
even in cases of seemingly arbitrary and minimal differences (Ysseldyk, Matheson, &
Anisman, 2010). This concept was further validated in a global analysis of cultural and
religious intergroup conflict. The analysis, including 194 religious and ethnic groups
around the world from 97 sites, found that in places where religion is highly infused in
group life (e.g., Pakistan), groups were significantly more prejudiced against opposing
groups with incompatible values (e.g., Christians and Sunni Muslims in Pakistan), which
led to greater discrimination (Neuberg et al., 2014). The study found, further, that when a
disadvantaged group had lower levels of religious infusion (secularists in Argentina), the
group typically avoided direct, aggressive conflict against the more resource-rich and
powerful counterparts (Christians in Argentina), whereas disadvantaged groups with high
levels of religious infusion sought out direct and aggressive conflicts (Palestinians versus
Israelis), even in the face of significant tangible costs (Neuberg et al., 2014).
Further, religious infusion was also a significant predictor of all forms of conflict
including prejudice, interpersonal discrimination, individual and collective violence, and
demonstrated increases in symbolic aggression (Neuberg et al., 2014). Not only does this
demonstrate the importance of social identity, it may explain why atheists in the United
States are less aggressive toward Christians versus the aggressive nature of
fundamentalist Christians toward religious minorities and secular ideas (e.g., the “war on
Christmas”; Ferber, 2012). Lacking political representation, atheists lack the resources to
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challenge large, wealthy, and politically powerful Christian groups. Another study
suggests any culturally diverse organizations (e.g., religious groups that are shaped by
ideology and not necessarily ethnicity) are likely to experience conflict between the
minority and majority identities within the group as a result of the “us” versus “them”
social categorization practice (e.g., White and Black people belonging to the same
Christian denomination; Hofhuis, van der Zee, & Otten, 2012). This may offer insight
into why similar but different Christian groups experience conflict among themselves;
while they are similar in religion, interpretational differences create group differences
across denominations.
Studies informed by Social Identity Theory require two opposing groups who
challenge each other’s core motives of belonging and self-enhancement (Tajfel & Turner,
1986). However, these studies examine social identity differences between groups
without examining threats or emotions that underlie prejudice. The theory complements
other theories that may be more capable of explaining a specific threat or emotion related
to ingroup/outgroup threats and prejudice (Haselton & Buss, 2003). For this reason,
Social Identity Theory was revised over time, generating new theories. For example,
social identity threat theory emerged to assess how ingroups perceive outgroup threats as
well as how minorities, that frequently feel threatened, manage this situation (Alexander,
1974; Brewer, 1997; Brewer & Caporael, 1990; Cook, Purdie-Vaughns, Garcia, &
Cohen, 2012). As this theory branched into smaller subsets, one focused on the array of
emotions individuals experience related to prejudice and focusing specifically on which
threats prompted which emotions. This allowed for a look at the (a) interaction between
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outgroup threat and their emotional reactions and (b) subsequent behaviors associated
with each (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). To understand how group identities and emotional
threat perceptions interact, the proposed study will be informed by both Social Identity
Theory and the socio-functional approach to intergroup prejudice.
Rationale for SIT and Socio-functional Approach in Proposed Study
Frameworks that have been produced as a result of SIT, including the sociofunctional approach, are extensive and each assesses a small aspect of the complex
attitudes and the underlying mechanisms involved in intergroup relations (e.g., Feather &
McKee, 2012; Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007; Whitley, 1999). This study compared
emotions elicited by prejudice toward atheists and nontraditional religious groups in a
political context, and the socio-functional approach facilitated this assessment. SIT will
predict participants’ voting intentions relative to their own social identities. The sociofunctional approach has been used in other studies to assess the unique prejudice, and its
underlying emotions, exhibited toward atheists. Because atheists do not represent a
cohesive group, with no unifying doctrine, ethnicity or nationality, and no ideological
agreement outside of expressing disbelief in a deity, utilizing this approach to understand
the emotions associated with prejudice and discrimination toward atheists is necessary to
explain the gross underrepresentation of atheists in elected office.
However, many fringe groups are isolated from other groups and therefore unified
in their ideology and goals across members (e.g., Mormons and Scientologists; Doherty,
2014; McAllister, 2013; Olson, 2006; Urban, 2012). SIT has been particularly successful
at providing powerful explanations for ingroup bias and outgroup stereotyping (Brown,
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2000). However, SIT could become more predictive by incorporating affect into the
theory (Brown, 2000). For that reason, using the socio-functional approach in relation to
SIT is useful. With this in mind, examining groups through the lens of SIT and the
sociofuntional approach may explain the unelectability of atheist political candidates as
well as predict participants’ ingroup voting favoritism. Furthermore, while SIT asserts
that participants will likely prefer candidates similar to themselves, the sociofuntional
approach allows for an examination of the emotions associated with the types of
perceived threats from dissimilar candidates. Both theories serve to explain the prejudice
underlying the historical unelectability of atheist candidates seeking political office.
Literature Review Related to Key Variables
Key variables related to this study include (a) religious discrimination, with a
focus on atheists as well as nontraditional religious identities (b) ingroup/outgroup
prejudice and discrimination as a function of social identity (c) voting behavior as a
function of ingroup/outgroup prejudice and discrimination, and (d) the emotional
responses associated with ingroup/outgroup prejudice and discrimination. Literature
related to these variables as well as the methodology of this study were reviewed and
synthesized in order to identify areas for future research and understand the background
of the problem in its entirety. The predominance of Christian political representation has
resulted in the lack of representation in both nontraditional religious and nonreligious
individuals. This minimizes these groups ability to effectively fight for issues important
to them, while increasing the ability of Christians to do so. The purpose of this study is
to gain greater understanding of the prejudice that makes it difficult for nonreligious
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political candidates to both run and win elected office, as well as political candidates
from less traditional religious groups.
Religious Discrimination
Within social psychological study, researchers have attempted to understand the
complex mechanisms of religion (e.g., Allport, 1950; Allport, 1966; Brown, 1964; Hall,
Matz, & Wood, 2010; Herek, 1987). One of the most fascinating discoveries regarding
religious study is the relationship between religiosity and prejudice/discrimination.
Gordon Allport (as cited in Allport & Ross, 1967) described religious individuals as
possessing either intrinsic or extrinsic orientation toward religion, which motivated
prejudice and discrimination. An extrinsic religious orientation means the individual has
personal motives that lie outside of religion (e.g., social acceptance) and is, therefore,
using religion for some nonreligious ends (e.g., social advancement; Allport, 1950). An
intrinsic religious orientation means the individual believes in living by the letter of the
religious doctrine; the motives to be religious lie within the individual (Allport, 1950).
Allport and Ross (1967) found that churchgoers were more prejudiced than nonchurchgoers, and that within the churchgoer group, people described as indiscriminately
pro-religious were the most prejudiced of all. Focused on ethnic discrimination, Allport
and Ross noted that individuals with an extrinsic religious orientation were significantly
more prejudiced than those with an intrinsic religious orientation. However, subsequent
studies that have utilized the religious orientation approach find that individuals with an
intrinsic orientation are also prejudiced, but their target of prejudice is instead the LGBT
community (Herek, 1987). This presented new evidence that religion itself could not
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only provide justification for prejudice, but engender it as a result of its teachings. That
is because the LGBT community is viewed as a moral threat to Christian religious
teachings, as it is viewed as a sin. This corresponds to research findings utilizing the
socio-functional approach to prejudice that suggest members of the LGBT community
are viewed as a moral threat and therefore people are disgusted by them (Cottrell &
Neuberg, 2005; Franks & Scherr, 2014).
Religion has historically been difficult to operationally define, and as such
different researchers have approached the topic of religion through different lenses.
Allport (1962) stated that religious prejudice be considered in the context of the personal
(e.g., personality factors of the individual) and society (e.g., social groups, authority
figures, and hierarchical structures). Some research focuses on the organizational
structure of religion (e.g., the institution of religion) and its subsequent effects (e.g.,
Heichel, Knill, & Schmitt, 2013; Sommer, Bloom, & Arikan, 2013; Swan, Heesacker,
Snipes, & Perrin, 2014). For example, highly religious nations were found not to be less
corrupt than nonreligious nations, and instead democracy seemed to be a necessary
element of a religious nation to curtail corruption (Sommer, Bloom, & Arikan, 2013).
Other researchers focus on the benefits or consequences to the individual as a result of
the practice or adherence to religion as well as differences between spiritual and religious
belief concepts and how these vary from the ritualistic practice of religion (e.g., Ivtzan,
Chan, Gardner, & Prashar, 2013; Lutjen, Silton, & Flannelly, 2012; Wilson, Bulbulia, &
Sibley, 2014). Some studies compare the differences between religion as a practice and
institution with god concepts (e.g., morality and prosociality) to determine how each
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affects people differently (e.g., Preston & Ritter, 2013; Shariff & Norenzayan, 2007;
Shariff, Willard, Andersen, & Norenzayan, 2015).
Research often distinguishes between spirituality and religion, claiming that
religion is a practice while spirituality is a belief. An individual may not necessarily
practice specific behaviors or adhere to a given institution as a result of his or her belief
(e.g., Emmons, 1999; Pargament, 1999; Zinnbauer, Pargament, & Scott, 1999).
Pargament (1999) believed that while religion is defined as institutional, organizational,
ritualistic, and ideological, spirituality is defined as personal, affective, experiential, and
thoughtful. Because Social Identity Theory deals with an individual’s identity in relation
to his or her social groups, the proposed study will focus on the institution and practice of
religion.
Both prejudice and discrimination in relation to religion come in many forms.
Studies have been conducted to demonstrate the role of religion in discriminating against
ethnicities and races (e.g., Johnson, Rowatt, & LaBouff, 2010; Rowatt & Franklin, 2004),
sexual orientation (e.g., Cunningham & Melton, 2013; Whitley, 2009; Woodford, Levy,
& Walls, 2013), as well as gender (e.g., Burn & Busso, 2005; Maltby, Hall, Anderson, &
Edwards, 2010; Mikołajczak & Pietrzak, 2014; Taşdemir & Sakall-Uğurlu, 2010).
Studies also show country-specific majority religions (e.g., Christianity in the U.S.)
discriminate against minority religions (e.g., Muslim immigrants) in that same country
(e.g., Jasperse, Ward, & Jose, 2012; Taras, 2013; Wallace, Wright, & Hyde, 2014). This
prejudice and discrimination often become political and polarized (Ghumman & Ryan,
2013; Hauslohner, 2017; Khera & Smith, 2017; Taras, 2013). For example, in the United
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States, the Republican Party often brands itself as the party of “family values” in an
appeal to Christian Evangelicals, and in doing so invokes biblical doctrine (Patrikios,
2008; Tavits & Potter, 2015). As a counterpoint, the Democratic Party’s more secular
platform is criticized by the right as an attack on their religious values, creating an “us”
versus “them” culture conflict over what constitutes American values (Patrikios, 2008).
Interestingly enough, this type of culture conflict spurs the Christian majority into
often claiming themselves the target of discrimination; they lament a future of an
America losing its Christian identity (Coston & Kimmel, 2012; Jones et al., 2016).
Referred to as Christonormativity, this phenomenon is the result of Christian dominance
and privilege in the United States (Ferber, 2012; Steinberg & Kincheloe, 2008). Some
researchers even suggest that Christianity is so dominant in U.S. culture, that it can be
implicated in all other categories of oppression (e.g., racism, sexism, heterosexism,
ableism, classism, etc.) as the cause justified by biblical arguments (e.g., Bible verses that
refer to gay sex as an abomination, women as subordinate to men, other religions as
worthy of death; Ferber, 2012; Todd, 2010). Examples of studies in this area include (a)
changing perceptions of Americans toward Middle Eastern immigrants as they have
shifted from majority-Christian to majority-Muslim and (b) the prevalence of Christian
privilege in schools that marginalize all non-Christian students (Blumenfeld, Joshi, &
Fairchild, 2009; Nelson, 2009; Tehranian, 2009).
While many Christian groups are vocal about the perceived lack of religious
freedom, these groups are often able to discriminate against women, the LGBT
community, immigrants, Muslims, and the nonreligious (e.g., Gerstein, 2016; Hiltzik,
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2017). Not only through public perception, but politically, Christians wield a great deal
of power, enabling them to legislate their values through measures that: prevent women
from obtaining access to abortion and birth control, laws that restrict transgender
bathroom use, challenge the legality of marriage equality, and fight against immigration,
particularly Muslims (e.g., Masci & Lipka, 2015; Zapotosky, Nakamura, & Hauslohner,
2017). The nonreligious and atheist population of the US do not curry this favor with the
predominately Christian Congress, and because of public perception and systemic
prejudice and discrimination against the nonreligious, are unlikely to achieve elected
status to empower themselves politically (Franks & Scherr, 2014).
Atheists and Nonreligious. It has been argued that sweeping anti-religious and
anti-immigrant movements are often recycled in different regions and at different points
in time, but utilize the same emotional rhetoric customized to target different groups
(Casanova, 2012). This can be seen in the 19th-century toward Catholic immigrants in
America, which was largely supported through nativism, and is currently taking place in
Europe and America targeting Muslim immigrants (Casanova, 2012). Another example
of this was during the American “Red Scare” that fueled a great deal of anti-Asian, anticommunist, and anti-atheist attitudes and policies in the US (Skoll & Korstanje, 2013).
Atheist prejudice and discrimination in the U.S. is prevalent, with citizens disliking
atheists more than any religious group and over half stating they would not support an
atheist candidate for president (Lipka, 2016a). This could be partly because the U.S. is
comparatively more religious than other developed nations, or it could be related to the
rhetoric that fueled fear of “godless communism” (Skoll & Korstanje, 2013).
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Atheists have faced a variety of types of discrimination within the U.S. Atheism
is a concealable identity that carries enormous stigma, and like other stigmatized groups
(e.g., LGBT), choose to remain “in the closet” for fear of backlash (Johnson, Rowatt, &
LaBouff, 2012; Quinn & Chaudoir, 2009). This concealable stigmatized identity (CSI)
presents problems both for those who choose to “out” themselves as well as those who
choose to conceal their identity for fear of discrimination (Cragun et al., 2012b; Doane &
Elliot, 2015; Quinn & Chaudoir, 2009). A recent study concluded that traditional polling
methods do not account for this stigmatization and as such even with anonymity, atheists
do not self-identify as such through direct poll questions (Gervais & Najle, 2017).
However, through the unmatched count technique and Bayesian estimation, the study
found that atheist prevalence exceeds 11% of the population with greater than .99
probability and exceeds 20% with roughly .8 probability (Gervais & Najle, 2017). The
most credible estimate was 26%, which is much larger than the Pew reported figure of
3.1% (Gervais & Najle, 2017; Pew Research Center, 2014a).
At present, open atheist identification is difficult as evidence suggests that atheists
who do openly identify face verbal abuse, ostracism, prejudice and discrimination, and
are targets of hate crimes (Giddings & Dunn, 2016; Hammer, Cragun, Hwang, & Smith,
2012). For example, some court cases have denied custody to one parent simply because
of atheist identification (Volokh, 2006). Atheists are also targets of hiring and job
discrimination (Gervais, Shariff, & Norenzayan, 2011; Wallace et al., 2014). They are
also targets of political discrimination, making it difficult for atheists to run for or be
elected to public office (Franks & Scherr, 2014). Recently, Mark Zuckerberg, who had
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been an open atheist recanted his atheist identification, and many believed this is because
he aspires to be elected to office, and open atheism is considered “political suicide”
(Solon, 2017). Given the pervasiveness of anti-atheist prejudice and discrimination, it is
noteworthy that research documenting it began as recently as the 2000s.
Research documenting the perceptions of atheist morality has been the major
focal point of anti-atheist studies, with a great deal of evidence supporting the belief that
atheists are immoral and therefore not trustworthy (e.g., Edgell, Gerteis, & Hartmann,
2006; Gervais, Shariff, & Norenzayan, 2011; Gervais, 2013). Experiments asking
participants to judge who would likely have committed serial murder, consensual incest,
necrobestiality, and cannibalism found that American participants intuitively believed
these actions to be representative of atheists, more so than eleven other religious, ethnic,
and cultural groups (Gervais, 2014). This type of prejudice has been found to be very
resilient, with some studies suggesting anti-atheist prejudice is best explained by the
perception that atheists lack the capacity for caring, kindness, and compassion, while
other studies find atheists are viewed as repugnant and as such elicit moral disgust
(Anderson, 2016; Cook, Cottrell, & Webster, 2015; Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012a;
Mudd, Najle, Ng, & Gervais, 2015; Simpson & Rios, 2016). One study even suggests
American participants found beverages more disgusting tasting after copying a passage
from either the Qur’an or the book The God Delusion by Richard Dawkins (Ritter &
Preston, 2011). Interestingly, this study also found that allowing participants to wash
their hands following the copying of the passage, eliminated the disgust, suggesting that
symbolic disgust manifests physically and removing it protects an individual’s moral
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values (Ritter & Preston, 2011). In 2015, researchers examining existential threats found
that atheists prompt the religious to question their beliefs and think about death, creating
a fear threat reaction, which increased disparagement, social distancing, and distrust of
atheists (Cook, Cohen, & Solomon, 2015). Together it suggests that anti-atheist
prejudice is highly complex and further investigation is necessary to explain the
underrepresentation of atheists in political office.
Researchers have tested strategies for eliminating anti-atheist prejudice. Some
suggest that research questions frame atheism as positive (e.g., the majority of scientists
and academics are nonbelievers) and that skepticism has become increasingly necessary
in society, thus it is a valued trait and the natural outcome of skepticism may be
agnosticism or atheism (Caldwell-Harris, 2012). This concept was furthered by
Norenzayan and Gervais (2013) in their discussion of the origin and evolution of
religious disbelief. Studies have used imaginative scenarios or priming methods, finding
that (a) priming secular concepts or (b) showing visuals of interactions with atheists
decreases bias and prejudice (Gervais, 2011; Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012b; LaBouff &
Ledoux, 2016; LaBouff, Rowatt, Johnson, & Finkle, 2012). This is especially important
regarding institutions of government and power, such as police, court systems, and
government officials, as evidence suggests that foregrounding secular rule of law
decreases political intolerance and prejudice toward atheists (Norenzayan & Gervais,
2015). Finding ways to minimize anti-atheist prejudice is a necessary step toward
increasing their political representation.
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While most of the anti-atheist literature has focused on morality, little research
has examined atheist prejudice and discrimination in a political context despite their
conspicuous underrepresention in elected office. Franks and Scherr (2014) examined
anti-atheist prejudice in politics and found that atheist candidates faced greater levels of
distrust, disgust, and fear, as well as decreased voter intention compared to other
historically marginalized candidates such as African American and gay males. Other
studies have confirmed that religious identity labeling plays a role in how an individual is
perceived (Charles, Rowland, Long, & Yarrison, 2012; Swan & Heesacker, 2012). With
this in mind, it is expected that examining religious identity in a political context would
place even greater importance on the religious identity-participant perception
relationship, given the importance of political positions.
Franks and Scherr (2017) and Franks (2017) expanded on this research to
understand anti-atheist prejudice in a political context. Franks and Scherr (2017) found
that analytic thinking (operationalized for the study as performance on the Cognitive
Reflections Test) increased acceptance of secular ideas and reduced anti-atheist prejudice
(operationalized as the participant’s willingness to vote for the atheist). However, it may
be difficult to prime analytic thinking in a real-world election, and other research that has
attempted to prime analytic thinking did not find reduced anti-atheist bias, suggesting that
where the study takes place (e.g., church vs. school) and the type of sample may alter the
results (Sanchez, Sumdermeier, Gray, & Calin-Jageman, 2017). For example, voters
facing a polling location with confusing and complex voting rules and long lines may
resort to intuitive and emotion-based (Berger, Meredith, & Weaver, 2008; Eidelman,
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Crandall, Goodman, & Blanchar, 2012; Franks & Scherr, 2017; Greene, Morelli,
Lowenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008; Mani, Mullainathan, Shafir, & Zhao, 2013).
Franks (2017) also found that while informational manipulations (e.g., suggesting an
atheist candidate is popular to participant groups) improved voter intention for the
candidate, Christian participants still preferred a Christian candidate similar to
themselves. It was noted however, that the participants were more likely to consider the
atheist candidate if the Christian candidate was labeled a theocrat (Franks, 2017). This
suggests that pejorative representation of a religious candidate or ideology (e.g., referring
to a fringe or nontraditional religion as a cult) may alter perceptions and value
assessments of the candidate and therefore voter intentions.
Nontraditional Religious Groups. It is not yet known how nontraditional
religious groups would compare to the nonreligious in a political contest; however, it is
known that these groups also face discrimination. Many major religions paradoxically
present both prosocial and aggressive tendencies. Research examining this paradox in
both Catholic and Protestant Christians found that different presentations of God
prompted different behaviors from believers (Johnson, Li, Cohen, & Okun, 2013). When
God is presented as an authoritarian figure (e.g., controlling, commanding, or punishing)
Christians were more likely to behave aggressively toward outgroups (Johnson et al.,
2013). When God was instead presented as benevolent (e.g., helping, forgiving, or
protecting) Christians were more likely to engage in volunteerism and provide aid to
outgroups (Johnson et al., 2013). Further, when God concepts were experimentally
manipulated for non-Catholic Christians, the benevolent God increased an individual’s
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willingness to forgive others, whereas the authoritarian God decreased forgiveness
(Johnson et al., 2013). Many stories of the Christian God frequently depict a figure that
demands obedience, so these findings paint a grim picture for groups seeking to avoid
prejudice from traditional Christians in the U.S.
Groups that either (a) receive a great deal of attention in the media such as
Muslim immigrants, (b) are increasing in popularity and in the number of adherents such
as atheists, or (c) have practices too far removed from the mainstream religion such as
Scientology, are likely to be targets of Christian prejudice. A study seeking to examine
perceptions of cults presented participants with descriptions of indoctrination practices
for groups labeled the Marines, the Catholic Church, and the Moonies, where
indoctrination practices were identical for each group. A vignette was presented of a
young man joining either the Marines, the Catholic Seminary, or the Moonies.
Participants were then asked to evaluate each of the practices, and researchers noted
variations among participant perceptions simply as a result of the group’s identity
(Pfeifer, 1992). Participants were more likely to prefer the term “brainwashing” to
describe the techniques of the Moonies, “resocialization” for the techniques of the
Catholic Church, and “conversion” for the techniques of the Marines, despite their
identical descriptions (Pfeifer, 1992). Further, the man was judged to have been coerced
into joining the Moonies and participants were more likely to rate a negative description
of cult activity as more accurate than a positive description. This means that people’s
evaluations of an indoctrination process are often based on emotional reactions from
negative schematic representations, rather than an objective evaluation of the group’s
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practices. The study examined how individuals view cults and their practices and found
that public perception is more powerful than the practices of the group itself.
Furthermore, the study found that people generally were not well-informed about groups
considered to be cults, and much of the information individuals did possess was acquired
secondhand based on public perceptions rather than accurate information (Pfeifer, 1992).
Many minority and nontraditional religions in the U.S. are often labeled as a cult
by the general population, if the group is newly established or has practices considered
too far removed from those of the mainstream. Research suggests that many Americans
are prejudice toward Mormons specifically as they perceive the religion as smaller and
newer comparative to other mainstream religions, and older religious practices are
viewed as more stable and pure (Eidelman, Pattershall, & Crandall, 2010; Heise, 2013;
Warner & Kiddoo, 2014). This makes Pfeifer’s (1992) findings relevant to the public
perception of smaller or newer religious groups (e.g., Scientologists and Mormons). Both
religions were founded in the United States (considered a comparatively “new” country),
and both have a small percentage of adherents compared to mainstream religions and
even compared to the atheist population. An interesting consideration of studies
examining cult perceptions is identifying a group as a cult, which can be difficult. First,
no religious group or adherent considers themselves as a cult or cultist, while the general
public tends to view newer or nontraditional religions as cults, suggesting that outsiders
of the religion view them negatively (Cragun et al., 2012a). The literature on cult
identification only further complicates this issue finding it difficult to determine which
groups are considered a cult and which are not. Richardson (1993) states that the term
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cult was once understood to refer to a religious group with a charismatic founder and
these groups were contrasted with other religious organizational types. However, now
the term cult is a pejorative used as a catch-all that refers to any unusual religious groups
and their activities (Lalich, 2009; Richardson, 1993). Groups that are a part of the
anticult movement (ACM) successfully utilized the tactic of labeling a religious group as
a cult to curry public support for raids of the Fundamentalists Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter Day Saints in 2008 and the Waco Branch Davidians in 1993 (Barker, 1986;
Wright, 2011; Wright & Fagen, 2011).
Olson (2006) suggests that relabeling the term cult to “New Religious Movement”
or “New Christian Church” reduced negative attitudes. Furthermore, New Christian
Church garnered the most positive responses, implying that there is a differentiation
between a new religious group and a new Christian group (Olson, 2006). A study
conducted by Cragun, Henry, Homan, and Hammer (2012) compared attitudes toward
cult members and atheists and found that the students surveyed held greater negative
attitudes toward cultists than atheists. However, the context for this study was not
political. Furthermore, the study compared atheists and “cult members” and did not use
any real-world religious examples of a group that may be considered a cult to the general
public (e.g., Scientologists or Mormons).
The proposed study, inspired by the Cragun et al. (2012a) and Franks and Scherr
(2014) studies, seeks to bridge this gap, by providing actual nontraditional religious
examples (i.e., Scientologists and Mormons), often depicted as cult-like, in a political
context. The proposed study seeks to compare candidates from each religious affiliation
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with atheist candidates to assess the electability of atheists candidates with other,
typically reviled religious groups.
One religious group that often receives negative attention is the Church of
Scientology (Doherty, 2014; McAllister, 2013). The unusual structure and teachings of
the church have led many to believe the church leadership uses brainwashing techniques
to maintain control of its members. This is in part a result of the history of the Church’s
founder, L. Ron Hubbard, who is often positioned as a cult leader with ties to the famous
occultist Aleister Crowley (Urban, 2012). The reclusive nature of the church combined
with media portrayals and interviews from individuals who have “escaped,” reinforce the
image of the church as a cult (Doherty, 2014; Gilbert, 2016; McAllister, 2013; Thurm,
2015).
Another religious group that frequently receives negative attention is the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, commonly referred to as the Mormon Church.
Despite the fact the church is a Christian denomination, its divergence from mainstream
Christian doctrine makes it the target of religious prejudice (Penning, 2009). It has been
argued that the prejudice and discrimination Mormons face is similar to 19th Century
Catholics and modern-day Muslims in America (Grow, 2004; Penning, 2009). However,
Catholics now enjoy a great deal of power and political relevance, whereas the Mormon
Church has yet to accomplish this feat (Grow, 2004). An article posted on a site hosted
by the Protestant-affiliated Liberty University argues that the cosmology argument
presented by the Mormon Church is too similar to evolution and therefore justifies
Mormonism’s defeat (Pruitt, 2014). Historical review and academic studies contend that
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a great deal of the negative perception of Mormons stems from the belief that Mormons
devalue women (e.g., polygamy). Furthermore, when individuals believe the church is a
newer religion, they desire greater social distance (the levels of intimacy tolerated) from
the church (Heise, 2013; Warner & Kiddoo, 2014). Greater social distance toward a
group is a sign of greater levels of prejudice as well as less positivity toward the group
(Warner & Kiddoo, 2014). Groups and practices perceived as older are viewed more
positively (stable and entitative) than those that are relatively new (Eidelman, Pattershall,
& Crandall, 2010). As the Mormon Church is the only major religion established on
American soil (in 1830) the religion itself is viewed as new, and this study found that the
view “older is better” extends to adherents of a group and not just the group itself
(Warner & Kiddoo, 2014).
Politically, the Mormon candidates may find themselves in a difficult position, as
the conservatives struggle to view them as “Christian” and liberals find them too
repressive (Smith, 2014; Smith, 2016). During the 2007 election cycle, Mitt Romney’s
religion was a major focal point of media coverage, accounting for 30 percent of his total
media coverage and 50 percent of all religion-related presidential primary stories (Baker
& Campbell, 2010). A later evaluation of the candidacy of Mormon presidential
candidate Mitt Romney found that many conservatives were hesitant to vote for him,
particularly those that did not strongly identify as a Republican. However for those
individuals that did strongly identify as a Republican, party identity and the desire for
their candidate to win led many Christian voters to identify Mormons as Christian and
reconcile voting for Romney (Smith, 2016). However, overall voter aversion to
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Mormons is increasing as a result of Romney’s candidacy (Smith, 2014). Surveys
examining voter intentions and feelings following the 2008 election find that
conservatives do not want to vote for a Mormon candidate, as “they are not really
Christian” and liberals do not want to vote for a Mormon candidate because they
“represent a repressive religious coalition” (Smith, 2014). A separate study found voters
in the 2008 election were more concerned with Romney’s religious affiliation than any
other candidate (Campbell, Green, & Monson, 2012). Furthermore, exposure to
Mormons related directly to individual perceptions of Mormons. Those voters who had
no prior exposure to Mormons were likely to be persuaded by both negative and positive
information, while voters with sustained Mormon contact were not likely persuaded by
information either way. Most interestingly, voters with moderate contact reacted the
strongest to negative information about Mormons but were not persuaded by positive
information (Campbell et al., 2012). Given that Mormons are only 1.6% of the U.S.
population, this may explain why findings indicate a rise in voter aversion toward
Mormon candidates following Romney (Pew Research Center, 2014b; Smith, 2014).
This may also suggest that atheist candidates may face the same obstacles, given their
population size (3.1%) and the odds of the average person interacting with atheists
regularly (Pew Research Center, 2014a). As a result, it is important to consider the role
of religious identity and subsequent voter intention.
Ingroup/Outgroup Prejudice and Discrimination as a Function of Social Identity
Some social identity literature emphasizes prejudice and discrimination as an
aspect of outgroup threat perceptions. Other studies instead focus on prejudice as a
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function of ingroup favoritism, with no malicious intent (Dunkel & Dutton, 2016). An
example of the latter would be employment networking. Employers frequently ask
employees to refer their qualified acquaintances to apply for positions within the
company. However, most people affiliate with others similar to themselves culturally
and ideologically (e.g., ethnicity, religious identity). This can create unintentional
segregation in a workplace when networking is largely responsible for job applicants and
hiring, leading to unintentional discrimination toward applicants from different
backgrounds simply because they were never considered to begin with (Greenwald &
Pettigrew, 2014). This type of discrimination is, therefore, a function of networking and
ingroup preference rather than outgroup prejudice based on threat perceptions and
hostility (Greenwald & Pettigrew, 2014). The authors argue, further, that discrimination
need not involve hostile prejudicial emotions, but simply be the act of treating others
unfairly or unequally “because of” race, skin color, sex, religion, national origin, age, or
disability status, regardless of any intention to do so (Greenwald & Pettigrew, 2014).
While this ingroup favoritism may explain certain facets of how atheists become
marginalized politically (e.g., Christians are more likely to vote for candidates like
themselves) research suggests atheists are viewed as criminal and threatening (e.g.,
Gervais, 2013; Gervais, 2014; Gervais et al., 2011; Gervais et al., 2017). Therefore, the
more closely an individual’s religious identity mirrors that of the target subject, the more
likely the individual is to accept, or in the case of the proposed study, vote for the similar
person while expressing prejudice toward dissimilar persons.
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It has been said that while individuals choose their ideologies, ideologies likewise
choose the people, based on the needs of those people and how maintaining that specific
belief structure serves those needs (Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009). For example, it has
been argued that Christian theology is not only useful in providing a moral code for its
adherents, but also useful as a weapon to protect Christians from outgroups that are
deemed threatening (Ferber, 2012; Todd, 2010). It is this function of social identity that
appears the most relevant to the proposed study, given the extreme emotional responses
typically associated with anti-atheist prejudice (Cook et al., 2015; Franks & Scherr, 2014;
Gervais et al., 2017). As Katz (1960) suggested, attitudes serve a specific function, and
the function served determines what may arouse or alter the attitude. Ego-defensive
attitudes are aroused by perceived threats, appeals of hatred, repressed impulses, and
authoritarian suggestion, whereas value-expressive attitudes are aroused by cues related
to the individual’s values and need to reassert self-image (Katz, 1960). As religious
identity serves both functions, it is particularly salient, and volatile when challenged.
Emotional Responses Association with Ingroup/Outgroup Prejudice and
Discrimination
Emotional responses related to ingroup/outgroup bias and prejudice are typically a
function of perceived threats and the emotions that underlie them (Cottrell & Neuberg,
2005). Gervais, Shariff, and Norenzayan (2011), Franks and Scherr (2014), and Cook,
Cottrell, and Webster (2015) find strong evidence that atheists are viewed as a threat to
physical safety (fear response) and a threat to group values (disgust response).
Furthermore, perceptions of religion leave individuals believing religious belief is
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necessary to promote important prosocial behaviors such as cooperation and morality and
to protect the social order. This means people believe if religion offers prosocial benefits,
an individual lacking religious belief does not offer these benefits (Cook et al., 2015;
Franks and Scherr, 2014; Gervais, 2011). In a study examining emotional responses,
prejudice, and voting behavior, a positive relationship was found between disgust
sensitivity and political conservativism (Inbar, Pizarro, Iyer, & Haidt, 2012). Given what
is known about atheists in relation to moral threat perceptions and feelings of disgust,
conservatism may be a strong predictor of anti-atheist prejudice, and party identity may
also predict participant voting based solely on religious identities.
Voting Behavior as a Function of Ingroup/Outgroup Prejudice and Discrimination
Voting behavior is often linked to group behavior and identity (Ben-Bassat &
Dahan, 2012). Furthermore, voting behavior and its relationship to prejudice and
discrimination has been examined in several election cycles, with the most prominent
being the 2008 presidential election. Researchers found that individuals with greater
levels of explicit racial and ethnic prejudice were less likely to vote for Barack Obama
and more likely to vote for John McCain (Payne et al., 2010). However, individuals with
higher levels of implicit ethnic and racial prejudice, while more unlikely to vote for
Obama were not more likely to vote for McCain, instead choosing to abstain or vote for a
third-party candidate (Payne et al., 2010). A study examining affective reactions to
policies that benefit marginalized and historically discriminated against groups accurately
predicted that if the individual held a prejudicial emotion such as disgust toward
homosexuals, a policy that benefited homosexuals was also viewed as disgusting
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(Cottrell, Richards, & Nichols, 2010). Importantly, general affect measures of prejudice
(e.g., measuring general feelings or averaging specific emotions for a composite index of
general affect) did not accurately predict policy attitudes, but measures of specific
emotions (e.g., disgust) did (Cottrell et al., 2010). Furthermore, a study comparing
affective polarization across party lines found that participants were not only immediately
hostile (as measured by implicit association tests) to nonpartisan targets (e.g., a person
with a different party affiliation) but that the responses were stronger in intensity than
racial prejudice (Iyengar & Westwood, 2015). As such, voting behavior is strongly
linked to ingroup identity and those in the outgroup engender strong negative emotions
and prejudice.
Results from three separate studies find that participants will abstain from voting
when the election lacks candidates who endorse their specific moral concerns and values
(Johnson et al., 2014). These concerns include care and fairness, which predicted voting
intention for liberal voters, while loyalty, authority, and sanctity concerns predicted
voting intentions for conservatives (Johnson et al., 2014). Taken together with other
studies, these findings suggest atheists must be aware of the social identity they present
as well as demonstrate an ability to show kindness and caring in order to improve voting
intentions toward them (Kuppens & Yzerbyt, 2012; Simpson & Rios, 2017). If the
atheist candidate does not present a strong party identity, with an emphasis on that party’s
values, voters may simply focus on the atheist identity and their current perceptions of
atheists, continuing the cycle of atheist unelectability.
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Analyses of far-right leaders suggest that these leaders can influence
discriminatory action without directly using words associated with discrimination
(Verkuyten, 2013). One example is the characterization of Islam as a doctrine used for
violent political and religious ends versus Islam as a religion embraced and practiced by
Muslim people. By framing the two as separate from one another, leaders have
effectively defined Islam as an external threat to Western values, while simultaneously
resisting accusations of prejudice (Verkuyten, 2013). Similar tactics could be used
against atheists as well, by associating atheism with communism, similar to Cold War
strategies used to contrast the democratic Christian United States with Russia’s godless
tyranny (Skoll & Korstanje, 2013). While other historically marginalized groups (e.g.,
Blacks and the LGBT) have made large gains in political representation in the last few
decades relative to their population size, gaining proportional atheist representation will
likely be more difficult (Franks & Scherr, 2014). Religion informs U.S. society as both a
belief system and a social identity that atheists are perceived to stand in complete contrast
to and against. Not only are individuals more likely to trust a political candidate that
references God, but these references to God also reduce perceptions of a nation in decline
(Shepherd, Eibach, & Kay, 2016). Overcoming such barriers will be difficult, but
research may offer the best way to accomplish a representative government and
ameliorate the problem of atheist unelectability.
Summary and Conclusions
The purpose of this study is to demonstrate the comparative unelectability of
atheist political candidates because of perceived threats that elicit negative emotional
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responses (e.g., distrust, disgust, and fear). The findings may help alleviate this problem
and promote positive social change by achieving greater atheist representation and
legislative equality. Both the Social Identity Theory and the socio-functional approach
informed this study. Social Identity Theory suggests that participants will most likely
support candidates similar to themselves and less likely to support candidates dissimilar
to themselves, while the socio-functional approach to prejudice allows for the
measurement of participants’ emotional reactions to each candidate (Cottrell & Neuberg,
2005; Tajfel & Turner, 1986).
People view atheists as immoral and untrustworthy, making it difficult for atheists
to gain political representation (Gervais, 2013; Gervais et al., 2011). While some
examination of atheists in political settings has revealed atheists face more difficulty
obtaining elected status than Black or gay men, no study has compared the comparative
electability of atheists and nontraditional religious candidates (Franks & Scherr, 2014).
The aim of this study is to provide further insight into the problem of atheist
unelectability.
To examine the comparative electability of atheist and nontraditional religious
candidates, Chapter 3 describes the research design and approach used to answer the
research questions. Sampling, instruments, and the statistical methods utilized to analyze
the data will are also provided.
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Chapter 3: Research Method
Introduction
The underrepresentation of atheists in political office denies them the legislative
power enjoyed by other groups (Franks & Scherr, 2014; Pew Research Center, 2014a;
Sandstrom, 2017). Pervasive anti-atheist prejudice results in job discrimination,
difficulty winning child custody cases, and attacks in the public sphere based solely on a
lack of religious belief (e.g., Holland, 2015; Mehta, 2017; Wallace et al., 2014; Wing,
2015). Were atheists represented in elected office proportional to their representation in
the general population, they would be in a better position to address issues concerning
them. The purpose of this study is to examine the (a) comparative electability of atheists
to other nontraditional religious candidates and (b) emotions that underlie the prejudice
these candidates may face. To date, no study has examined the comparative electability
of American atheists to other nontraditional religious political candidates. Research
examining the electability of atheists is necessary to ameliorate the problem of their
underrepresentation, and in doing so, establishment of a more representative government.
This chapter presents information on the quantitative methodology the proposed
study will utilize, as well as participant recruitment and sample size information. The
measurement instruments are described as well as the rationale for their use. The
independent, dependent, and confounding variables are discussed, as well as the validity
and reliability of previous studies utilizing similar methodology and instruments. Data
collection procedures and analysis strategies are presented. The chapter concludes with a
discussion of the ethical procedures taken to protect participants.
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Research Design and Rationale
This study examines atheist electability to political office by measuring (a) voter
intention and (b) emotional responses to (d) political candidates based on their (d)
religious affiliation relative to the (e) participant’s religious identity. A quantitative
design was chosen for this study as it is appropriate for examining relationships among
variables. Qualitative designs do not rely on statistical analyses, and instead are more
exploratory in nature. The constructs to be assessed have been explored in previous
research, some of which used a similar framework and methodology (e.g., Franks &
Scherr, 2014, Cook, Cottrell, & Webster, 2015). Furthermore, a quantitative design
allows the study to be replicated more easily to verify the results across different samples
(Campbell & Stanley, 1963). Two independent variables (a) participant religious identity
and (b) candidate religious identity with at least four levels each (i.e., Protestant,
Scientologist, Mormon, and atheist) and four dependent variables (i.e., voter intention,
disgust, distrust, and fear) were examined to determine the relationship among them.
This factorial design is necessary to consider multiple factors together at once.
The participant’s voting intentions were measured by the voter likelihood scale
while the three emotional reactions (e.g., disgust, distrust, and fear) were measured by
three 7-point semantic differential scales. The research questions presented served as a
guide to assessing the statistical significance of the candidate’s religious identity (IV) and
its interaction with the participant’s religious identity (IV) and the main effects on voter
intention (DV), disgust (DV), distrust (DV), and fear (DV). One potential constraint may
be the difficulty in getting a sufficient number of participants for the rarer religious
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identities such as Scientology. However, as the main focus of the study is majority
prejudice against the minority religious groups, this will not impede completion of this
study.
The purpose of this study is to compare the electability of and emotional
responses to political candidates who represent traditional and nontraditional religious
affiliations, where voting intentions were used as a proxy to measure prejudice. The
research questions ask (a) if atheists experience greater discrimination when seeking
political office than candidates of nontraditional religious identities, (b) if participants are
more likely to vote or not vote for a candidate based on a similar or dissimilar religious
identity, and (c) which types of political candidate religious identities will rate worse on
the semantic scales regarding distrust, disgust, and fear.
Methodology
Population
The target population selected for this study is United States citizens over the age
of 18 that are legally allowed to vote. Recent reports of registered and eligible voters
place this population size at 218,959,000 (Goldmacher, 2016; Krogstad, 2016).
Individuals unable to read in English and those who do not have access to the Internet
will not be able to participate.
Sampling
Any research that uses the Internet to host surveys and collect data is utilizing a
type of nonprobability sampling strategy known as convenience sampling. The perk of
this method is the easily accessible participants; however, as with any nonrandom
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sampling method, there is no guarantee of accurately capturing a representative sample of
the population. The Internet does allow greater access to larger and more diverse
samples, but it is unlikely the sample will be truly representative. For example, the study
may unintentionally eliminate lower socioeconomic individuals who do not have Internet
access. Use of the Internet as a tool for sampling and hosting the survey was chosen to
minimize costs of conducting the study, to conveniently sample a large and diverse
group, and the convenience to participants. Survey Monkey both hosts the survey and
recruits participants via social media Internet advertising.
Power Analysis
An a priori analysis for an ANOVA with fixed effects, special-main effects, and
interactions utilizing G*Power suggested the study would require a sample size of 256
total participants (N = 256) to produce a moderate effect size (Cohen’s d = .5), with a
power level of .80, and an alpha level of .05 (Cohen, 1969). This includes the necessary
analyses with the 4 levels of the two independent variables, the 4 types of dependent
variables, the interaction of independent and dependent variables, and posthoc
comparisons (64 participants in each level of the 4-level variables). As such, participants
were randomly assigned one of four candidates, each candidate having a minimum of 64
participant responses each. The power of a test of statistical significance (.80) is defined
as the probability the test will reject the null hypothesis when it should (avoiding a Type
II error), essentially meaning there is an 80% chance of finding differences or
relationships among variables if they actually exist. This power is affected by the effect
size and the size of the sample. In the social sciences and specifically in similar studies
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to this one, the power level is generally accepted as .80 or greater, and thus why it was
chosen here. The alpha level of .05 means there is a 5% chance of a Type I error
occurring, and was chosen as conventional for social science studies as well as to match
similar previous studies. Effect size serves only as an estimate, as it cannot be calculated
until after data collection, however researchers typically estimate a moderate to large
effect size during power analysis, and studies similar to this one used Cohen’s d to
calculate effect size during analyses, and is why it was chosen here. Each value is not
only conventional for similar social science studies, but should also minimize errors and
demonstrate greater significance in the statistical findings if a relationship between
variables exists.
Procedures for Recruitment, Participation, and Data Collection
Following Walden University Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval, the
survey was hosted using the online survey site Survey Monkey, along with the candidate
descriptions and requests for demographic data such as participant age (legal voting age
and age of consent is 18 years of age), participant religious and political affiliation.
Using an online setting allows for greater access to a random and diverse sample, as well
as larger numbers of participants. The survey began with a consent form, informing
participants by entering the survey, they give consent to participate. This form states that
by continuing with the survey, the participant acknowledges they are at least 18 years old,
is able to read in English, and resides in the United States. Further, participants were
informed of the confidential and voluntary nature of the study, that participants may end
participation at any time or refrain from answering any questions, and that participants
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should not include any personally identifying information (e.g., name). The form
concluded with appropriate contact information for the university and researcher should
any questions or concerns arise. Participants pushed an “I Agree” button to proceed and
an “I Do Not Agree” button to discontinue.
Participants were recruited online using Survey Monkey, with postings to other
sites provided by the hosting site. Further, postings were made to the social media
website Facebook to religious group pages (e.g., Mormon, Scientologist, atheist) in order
to attract a variety of religious identities to participate. The survey was also posted on
sites aimed at attracting research participants such as Call for Participants and The
Inquisitive Mind. The survey was also later posted on Reddit. The recruitment flyer
asked participants to evaluate political candidates to determine how much information is
necessary to form accurate impressions; this slightly obscured the true purpose of the
study (Franks & Scherr, 2014). A copy of the recruitment flyer can be found in the
appendices. If told they were being assessed for prejudice and ingroup preferences,
participants’ responses may reflect a social desirability response (Podsakoff, MacKenzie,
Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). Participants were asked to read about a candidate running for
the U.S. House of Representatives, and were told the information may be about any
aspect of the candidate’s life or personality. The political candidate was described as a
39-year-old male named, John, whose political agenda prioritizes the economy, health
care, and education (Franks & Scherr, 2014). Participants were randomly assigned, using
Survey Monkey tools, to read about one of four candidates, identified as: Protestant,
atheist, Scientologist, or Mormon. The sample (N = 256) was divided into four groups
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(64 participants per candidate type). Each participant reviewed one of the four candidate
descriptions.
Following this, participants indicated their likelihood of voting for that candidate
using the voter likelihood scale and the three 7-point semantic differential scales
measuring distrust, disgust, and fear. The candidate description and subsequent surveys
were estimated to take approximately 10 minutes to complete. At the conclusion of the
survey, participants were directed to a page thanking them for their participation,
providing them with the true purpose of the study, and debriefing information; they were
provided with university and researcher emails for questions or concerns related to the
study.
Instrumentation and Operationalization of Constructs
Using the socio-functional approach as their framework, Franks and Scherr
(2014) developed the three 7-point semantic differential scales to measure disgust,
distrust, and fear along with the voter likelihood scale to measure voter intention. Using
the socio-functional approach, Franks and Scherr (2014) developed these measures to
examine anti-atheist prejudice in political settings. There are no psychometrics reported
for these measures beyond the pilot study for terminology and the significance measures
reported within the study. This study utilized these measures along with a similar
candidate description used by Franks and Scherr (2014); however, religious affiliation
will be manipulated rather than sexual orientation or race. These tools were developed in
a pilot study prior to the Franks and Scherr (2014) study which determined the word
choices for each of the three emotions (e.g., distrust, disgust, and fear). Informed by anti-

73
atheist prejudice research, these scales measure perceptions of atheist morality and
trustworthiness (e.g., Gervais, 2013; Gervais, 2014; Gervais et al., 2011). Permission for
use of the scales can be found in the appendices.
Demographic Questions
Demographic questions followed the consent page and asked the participant for
their religious and political affiliation, age, gender, education level, race, and
socioeconomic status. This information ensures a diverse sample has been obtained,
improving the generalizability of the data as well as checking for differences across
groups to address potential demographic confounds.
Candidate Description
Participants were randomly assigned one of four candidates running for the U.S.
House of Representatives to review. This description is similar to the candidate
description used in the Franks and Scherr (2014) study. The candidates were described
as follows: John is a 39-year-old [religious identity] male running for the U.S. House of
Representatives. He is married and has two children age 6 and 3. After graduating from
law school, he spent 10 years working as an assistant district attorney. In his spare time
he enjoys outdoor activities like hiking, kayaking, and skiing. His political agenda
prioritizes the economy, health care, and education. The only variance in candidate
descriptions will be the religious affiliation (e.g., Protestant, atheist, Scientologist, or
Mormon). The full description for each candidate can be found in the appendices.
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Three 7-Point Semantic Differential Scales
Each participant was asked to complete three separate 7-point semantic
differential scales, developed by Franks and Scherr (2014) to measure prejudice toward
atheist political candidates. Each scale measured participants’ feelings of trust, fear, and
disgust toward the candidate. Scale values range from “1” (untrustworthy, threatening,
and disgusting), to “7” (trustworthy, comforting, and appealing). The three 7-point
semantic differential scales can be found in the appendices.
The three 7-point semantic differential scales for distrust, disgust, and fear were
developed for a study examining anti-atheist prejudice in politics informed by the sociofunctional framework (Franks & Scherr, 2014). A pilot study was conducted to
determine the construct validity of an appropriate antonym for disgusting and an
appropriate description for fear of bodily harm. Frequencies were reported, with 18 out
of 20 respondents agreeing the words were appropriate. A copy of the pilot study and
frequencies can be found in the appendices. These scales were used to assess samples of
the U.S. voting population, similar to the proposed study (Franks & Scherr, 2014).
Statistical significance was demonstrated utilizing these scales, with Christian
participants rating atheists less trustworthy (95% CI (0.71, 2.08), p < .001, d = 1.08), gay
candidates more disgusting (95% CI (1.12, 2.51), p < .001, d = 1.18), and all minority
candidates more threatening (gay Candidate, 95% CI (0.32, 1.64), p = .004, d = 0.79;
atheist candidate, 95% CI (0.19, 1.44), p = .01, d = 0.67; and Black candidate, 95% CI (–
0.12, 1.29), p = .08, d = 0.45) than the White Christian candidate. This study
demonstrated the ability of the scales to measure participant disgust, distrust, and fear
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toward target candidates. Following data collection, Cronbach’s Alpha (to measure
internal consistency) was measured and a factor analysis for unidimensionality was
conducted. As there are three semantic differential scales, the alpha and factor analysis
were computed separately.
Voter Likelihood Scale
Participants reported their intention to vote for the candidate using the voter
likelihood scale developed by Franks and Scherr (2014). Ranging from 1 (no chance) – 9
(100% likely) the scale measures the likelihood participants will vote for each candidate.
The voter likelihood scale can be found in the appendices. Both this study and the Franks
and Scherr (2014) study sampled portions of the U.S. voting population. In the Franks
and Scherr (2014) study, participants (N = 200) used the scale to report the likelihood of
supporting a candidate type, and statistical significance was reported from the data
collected utilizing the scale. For example, Christians reported a significantly greater
likelihood of voting for the White Christian candidate than the gay male candidate, 95%
confidence interval (CI; 0.26, 2.20), p = .013, d = 0.70), and a greater likelihood of voting
for the White Christian candidate than the atheist candidate, 95% confidence interval
(1.13, 2.95), p < .001, d = 1.08), and significantly greater likelihood of voting for the
Black male candidate than the atheist candidate, 95% confidence interval (0.44, 2.48), p =
.005, d = 0.68). The difference in voting intentions from the White Christian to the
atheist candidate was especially large (i.e., d = 1.08), and the overall participant faith
status by candidate type interaction effect was also significant for voting intentions, F(3,
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167) = 8.01, p < .001, demonstrating the ability of the scale to measure voting intentions
(Franks & Scherr, 2014). This measure has strong face validity.
Data Analysis Plan
The effect of the two independent variables (e.g., candidate and participant
religious affiliation) on the four dependent variables (e.g., voter intention, distrust, fear,
and disgust) was analyzed quantitatively with four separate 2 x 4 factorial ANOVAs
using IBM-SPSS-24 software, where each of the two independent variables has four
conditions (i.e., Protestant, Mormon, Scientologist, and atheist). Demographic data was
assessed using descriptive statistical tests in SPSS. The means and standard deviations
were calculated. Data was screened to include only U.S. citizens of legal voting age.
Data cleansing was necessary only in cases with incomplete responses. Both Survey
Monkey and SPSS can be used to filter out incomplete cases; to minimize errors during
analysis. If there were insufficient distribution of cases in the eight cells of a 2 x 4
factorial ANOVA, then the participant religious affiliation factor would have been
discarded and only the 4-level candidate independent variable would be analyzed on each
of the four dependent variables.
Research Questions
Research Question #1: Do atheists face greater discrimination when seeking
political office than candidates who identify as mainstream Christian (Protestant), nonmainstream Christian (Mormon), or non-Christian (Scientologist) as measured by the
voting likelihood scale (Franks & Scherr, 2014)?
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Ho1: Atheists do not face greater discrimination when seeking political office
than candidates who identify as mainstream Christian (Protestant), non-mainstream
Christian (Mormon), or non-Christian (Scientologist) as measured by the voting
likelihood scale (Franks & Scherr, 2014).
Ha1: Atheists do face greater discrimination when seeking political office than
candidates who identify as mainstream Christian (Protestant), non-mainstream Christian
(Mormon), or non-Christian (Scientologist) as measured by the voting likelihood scale
(Franks & Scherr, 2014).
Research Question #2: Are participants more likely to vote for a candidate based
on ideological similarity, as predicted by social identity theory and measured by the
voting likelihood scale (Franks and Scherr, 2014)?
Ho2: Participants are not more likely to vote for a candidate based on ideological
similarity, as predicted by social identity theory and measured by the voting likelihood
scale (Franks & Scherr, 2014).
Ha2: Participants are more likely to vote for a candidate based on ideological
similarity, as predicted by social identity theory and measured by the voting likelihood
scale (Franks & Scherr, 2014).
Research Question #3: Are participants more likely to rate a candidate with lower
levels of trust (higher levels of distrust) when their ideologies are similar, as predicted by
social identity theory and the socio-functional approach, as measured by the 7-point
semantic differential scales (Franks & Scherr, 2014)?
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Ho3: Participants will not be more likely to rate a candidate with lower levels of
distrust (higher levels of trust) when their ideologies are similar, as predicted by social
identity theory and the socio-functional approach, as measured by the 7-point semantic
differential scales (Franks & Scherr, 2014).
Ha3: Participants will be more likely to rate a candidate with lower levels of
distrust (higher levels of trust) when their ideologies are similar, as predicted by social
identity theory and the socio-functional approach, as measured by the 7-point semantic
differential scales (Franks & Scherr, 2014).
Research Question #4: Are participants more likely to rate a candidate with lower
levels of disgust when their ideologies are similar, as predicted by social identity theory
and the socio-functional approach, as measured by the 7-point semantic differential scales
(Franks & Scherr, 2014)?
Ho4: Participants will not be more likely to rate a candidate with lower levels of
disgust when their ideologies are similar, as predicted by social identity theory and the
socio-functional approach, as measured by the 7-point semantic differential scales
(Franks & Scherr, 2014).
Ha4: Participants will be more likely to rate a candidate with lower levels of
disgust when their ideologies are similar, as predicted by social identity theory and the
socio-functional approach, as measured by the 7-point semantic differential scales
(Franks & Scherr, 2014).
Research Question #5: Are participants more likely to rate a candidate with lower
levels of fear when their ideologies are similar, as predicted by social identity theory and
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the socio-functional approach, as measured by the 7-point semantic differential scales
(Franks & Scherr, 2014)?
Ho5: Participants will not be more likely to rate a candidate with lower levels of
fear when their ideologies are similar, as predicted by social identity theory and the
socio-functional approach, as measured by the 7-point semantic differential scales
(Franks & Scherr, 2014).
Ha5: Participants will be more likely to rate a candidate with lower levels of fear
when their ideologies are similar, as predicted by social identity theory and the sociofunctional approach, as measured by the 7-point semantic differential scales (Franks &
Scherr, 2014).
Each independent variable will have at least four levels (i.e., candidate and
participant religious affiliation including Protestant, Mormon, Scientologist, and atheist
identities). A factorial analysis of variance was selected as the appropriate statistical test
of significance because there is more than one independent variable and each independent
variable has at least four levels. Furthermore, it is necessary to utilize a factorial
ANOVA to test not only the main effect of the variables but to assess the interaction
effect between the two independent variables. This interaction effect between the
candidate’s religious identity and the participant’s religious identity will be assessed, as
will the dependent variables (main effect) of voting intention, disgust, distrust, and fear as
measured by the voter likelihood scale and the three semantic differential scales, similar
to the approach used by Franks and Scherr (2014). As it is not possible to manipulate the
participant’s religious affiliation, at least four separate analyses will be conducted to
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compare participant religious identity to candidate religious identity, and the four
dependent variables, with each analysis using one level of the two independent variables
(e.g., Protestant candidate by Protestant candidate to voter intention, disgust, distrust, and
fear).
There are several methods of interpreting factorial ANOVA results. While the
simple main effects method is commonly used for studies with three or more factors, the
proposed study focuses more on the interaction than the main effect. Furthermore,
interpreting the main effect in the presence of a statistically significant interaction effect
could lead to erroneous conclusions. For example, if a focus is placed exclusively on
voting intentions (main effect) which will likely vary across candidates, the significance
of any interaction between candidate and participant identities may be minimized during
interpretation, resulting in less accurate conclusions. As such, the ANOVA results will
be interpreted using the pairwise comparison method, which is considered the most
useful interpretation method for determining which combination of factors produces the
most meaningful comparisons. Main effects will be examined for significance with
appropriate follow-up post-hoc analyses.
Threats to Validity
Possible threats to validity included participant response rates, as well as the
consideration of confounding variables. Religious identification is a sensitive issue and
atheist identification in particular is stigmatized; participants may not want to identify
themselves as such. The participants were told all responses are anonymous in hopes of
mitigating this issue. Demographic information was collected to minimize confounding
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variables and determine generalizability. Furthermore, the political candidates were
presented to participants with no political party affiliation. Political candidates’ policy
issues have been framed in non-partisan terms, allowing participants to make their own
inferences (e.g., prioritizes health care does not suggest if the candidate favors liberal or
conservative policies on the topic). Generalizability of the study may also be a threat to
validity, as this survey is limited to participants that read in English and have Internet
access, unintentionally lowering the chances low-socioeconomic individuals will be
included in the study. However, by collecting demographic data, variability in the
sample was determined to help minimize this threat as much as possible. Participants
who did not complete the entire survey will not be included to avoid threats related to
response rates.
Ethical Procedures
This study will obtained approval from the Walden University IRB prior to
collecting data. Furthermore, this study adheres to all ethical guidelines required by the
American Psychological Association’s (APA) Code of Conduct, such as maintaining
participant confidentiality and informing the participants of their right to stop
participation at any time (American Psychological Association, 2010). Participants
viewed an informed consent page prior to entering the survey, which will inform the
participants of their rights and the voluntary nature of this study. Data has been stored
securely, as both the researcher’s computer and Survey Monkey are password protected.
Data must be stored for a minimum of five years (American Psychological Association,
2010), and data collected will be viewed only by the researcher. Data disposal will be
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achieved by permanently deleting the information utilizing commercial software
designed to remove all data from a storage device such as Eraser. This study was not
expected to present psychological risks to the participants, however participants were
provided contact information for the researcher and institution for any questions or
concerns the participant might have as well as a debriefing form with instructions to print
the form for participant records. The debriefing page immediately followed the last
question on the survey. At this point, the purpose of the study was revealed, and
participants were allowed to withdraw their data now that he or she is fully informed as to
the intent and purpose of the study. Information on resources such as the IRB and health
resources that can be accessed either online or through telephone (as the survey is online
and participants may be anywhere in the United States) were provided. An “I Agree”
button was present for participants to consent to submit their data, while an “I Do Not
Agree” button was available to participants that choose to withdraw, and their data will
be deleted from the form and not submitted. A copy of the informed consent form and
the debriefing form can be found in the appendices.
Summary
This quantitative study will assess the comparative electability of atheist and
nontraditional religious political candidates using an online survey. Data was collected
from over 256 participants representative of the U.S. voting population. After the
participants read a brief candidate description, they were asked to report their voter
intention and emotional reactions to the candidate with the voter likelihood scale and the
three 7-point semantic differential scales. Data was analyzed with four separate 2 x 4
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factorial analyses of variance using IBM-SPSS-24 software. Participants entered the
survey through a consent page, and exited the survey through a debriefing page. All
Walden University IRB and APA Code of Conduct procedures were adhered to. Chapter
4 describes the data analyses and findings.
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Chapter 4: Results
Introduction
The purpose of this study was to quantitatively assess the comparative electability
of atheist political candidates with candidates from other nontraditional religious
backgrounds. This chapter describes the data collection, screening, and cleaning, as well
as provides the descriptive statistics for the variables of study and summarizes the results
of each factorial ANOVA.
Research Questions
Research Question #1: Do atheists face greater discrimination when seeking
political office than candidates who identify as mainstream Christian (Protestant), nonmainstream Christian (Mormon), or non-Christian (Scientologist) as measured by the
voting likelihood scale (Franks & Scherr, 2014)?
Ho1: Atheists do not face greater discrimination when seeking political office
than candidates who identify as mainstream Christian (Protestant), non-mainstream
Christian (Mormon), or non-Christian (Scientologist) as measured by the voting
likelihood scale (Franks & Scherr, 2014).
Ha1: Atheists do face greater discrimination when seeking political office than
candidates who identify as mainstream Christian (Protestant), non-mainstream Christian
(Mormon), or non-Christian (Scientologist) as measured by the voting likelihood scale
(Franks & Scherr, 2014).
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Research Question #2: Are participants more likely to vote for a candidate based
on ideological similarity, as predicted by social identity theory and measured by the
voting likelihood scale (Franks and Scherr, 2014)?
Ho2: Participants are not more likely to vote for a candidate based on ideological
similarity, as predicted by social identity theory and measured by the voting likelihood
scale (Franks & Scherr, 2014).
Ha2: Participants are more likely to vote for a candidate based on ideological
similarity, as predicted by social identity theory and measured by the voting likelihood
scale (Franks & Scherr, 2014).
Research Question #3: Are participants more likely to rate a candidate with lower
levels of trust (higher levels of distrust) when their ideologies are similar, as predicted by
social identity theory and the socio-functional approach, as measured by the 7-point
semantic differential scales (Franks & Scherr, 2014)?
Ho3: Participants will not be more likely to rate a candidate with lower levels of
distrust (higher levels of trust) when their ideologies are similar, as predicted by social
identity theory and the socio-functional approach, as measured by the 7-point semantic
differential scales (Franks & Scherr, 2014).
Ha3: Participants will be more likely to rate a candidate with lower levels of
distrust (higher levels of trust) when their ideologies are similar, as predicted by social
identity theory and the socio-functional approach, as measured by the 7-point semantic
differential scales (Franks & Scherr, 2014).
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Research Question #4: Are participants more likely to rate a candidate with lower
levels of disgust when their ideologies are similar, as predicted by social identity theory
and the socio-functional approach, as measured by the 7-point semantic differential scales
(Franks & Scherr, 2014)?
Ho4: Participants will not be more likely to rate a candidate with lower levels of
disgust when their ideologies are similar, as predicted by social identity theory and the
socio-functional approach, as measured by the 7-point semantic differential scales
(Franks & Scherr, 2014).
Ha4: Participants will be more likely to rate a candidate with lower levels of
disgust when their ideologies are similar, as predicted by social identity theory and the
socio-functional approach, as measured by the 7-point semantic differential scales
(Franks & Scherr, 2014).
Research Question #5: Are participants more likely to rate a candidate with lower
levels of fear when their ideologies are similar, as predicted by social identity theory and
the socio-functional approach, as measured by the 7-point semantic differential scales
(Franks & Scherr, 2014)?
Ho5: Participants will not be more likely to rate a candidate with lower levels of
fear when their ideologies are similar, as predicted by social identity theory and the
socio-functional approach, as measured by the 7-point semantic differential scales
(Franks & Scherr, 2014).
Ha5: Participants will be more likely to rate a candidate with lower levels of fear
when their ideologies are similar, as predicted by social identity theory and the socio-
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functional approach, as measured by the 7-point semantic differential scales (Franks &
Scherr, 2014).
Data Collection
Data collection began March 29, 2018, following approval from the IRB. The
survey was made accessible to the public, and links were generated and posted to
Facebook religious group pages in order to target the necessary participants (e.g.,
Mormon, Scientologist, atheist, Christian) as well as research participant sites such as
Call for Participants and The Inquisitive Mind. During data collection, the atheist group
of participants far outpaced other groups, particularly Christians, and as such it became
necessary to expand data collection to Reddit. This change in procedure was approved by
the Walden IRB on July 10, 2018. The survey was advertised in both religious and
political Reddit threads. The survey was concluded on September 24, 2018. Participants
were required to be of legal voting age in the US (18) and residents of the US.
Participants were asked twice if they wished to continue with the survey, once
after reading the informed consent page, before beginning the survey, and once again
before submitting their responses and following a debriefing page. For any participant
selecting the “no” box, they were rerouted to the end of the survey, thanking them for
their time. The informed consent page consisted of the purpose of the study, an outline of
the procedures for the study as well as the voluntary nature of participation, risks and
benefits, privacy rights, and contact information. Participants were also informed that
those who agreed to enter the survey were indicating their consent to participate, however
they were free to stop at any time, and were once again allowed to not submit their

88
responses at the conclusion of the survey. No personally identifying information was
collected, as it was not necessary for the nature of the study, further protecting
participants.
Recruitment, Change in Procedure, and Response Rates
Once the survey went live on Survey Monkey, advertisements to participants were
posted on Facebook pages targeting specific religious groups, with the expectation that
each religious group was represented within the study. Given the nature of social media
and that individual followers of a group page may have also chosen to share the survey
on their own pages or other pages, it is unknown if the survey was posted in other
locations. The survey was also shared on research-oriented sites such as Call for
Participants and The Inquisitive Mind, however very few participants were generated
through these pages. Survey Monkey provides separate collector links to track participant
totals from each collection type, and only 12 participants were counted between these two
pages. Facebook posts resulted in 616 participants.
The first week after the survey went live, participation was very high but then
began to wane. Most notably, while the atheist, agnostic, and nonreligious participants
already exceeded the necessary sample size, the survey was not attracting many Christian
participants. Because of this, a procedural change was submitted to the IRB in order to
expand data collection. The request sought to advertise the survey using Reddit, and was
approved in July, 2018. Reddit was then added as a collector, which resulted in 339 more
participants across all religious categories.
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The response rate for the survey was 89%, with 967 total participants and 862
completed surveys; the incomplete cases were removed from the data. Any participants
that chose not to submit their responses either at the beginning or end of the survey would
not have been calculated in the totals. Of the 862 participants, 88 participants belong to
Jewish (3), Muslim (1), Hindu (1), Buddhist (4), Native American (1), Wiccan (3),
Catholic (68), and Pagan (7) faiths, respectively, while 195 participants claimed to be
agnostic (76) or nonreligious (119). This leaves 579 participants identifying as Protestant
(64), Mormon (73), Scientologist, and atheist (373). The hypotheses for this study
focused only on Protestant, Mormon, Scientologist, and atheist participants and political
candidates of the same identities; therefore, only participants identifying as Protestant,
Mormon, Scientologist, or atheist were analyzed for the purposes of this study. The a
priori analysis for an ANOVA with fixed effects, special-main effects, and interactions
that was calculated using G*Power suggested the study would require a sample size of
256 total participants (N = 256) to produce a moderate effect size (Cohen’s d = .5), with a
power level of .80 and an alpha level of .05 (Cohen, 1969). As such, the participant total
far exceeds this goal. However, it is important to note the sample contains more atheist
participants than Mormon, Scientologist, and Protestant participants.
Descriptive Statistics and Demographic Characteristics
Table 1 displays the demographic data collected, (i.e., age, gender, education
level, race, socioeconomic status, political affiliation, religious identity). The largest
percentage of participants were 30-39 (N = 189, 32.6%) and more females than males
completed the survey (N = 329, 56.8%). The largest demographic disparity was found in
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race/ethnicity with 78.9% of participants identifying as White (N = 457). Education was
distributed across each choice, with the largest number of participants having completed
a 4-year college degree (N = 178, 30.7%). Nearly half of the participants identified as
Democratic (N = 289, 49.9%), and the most frequently reported household income was
between $25,000 and $49,000 (N = 111, 19.2%). Religious identity was fairly evenly
distributed across all groups except atheists which represented 44.3% of participants (N =
373).
Table 1
Frequencies: Age, Gender, Race/Ethnicity, Education, Political Affiliation, and Income
Variable
Age
18-20
21-29
30-39
40-49
50-59
60 +
Gender
Female
Male
Race/Ethnicity
American Indian
Asian
Black
Hispanic
White
Mixed
Education
Some High School
High School
Some College
2 Year Degree
4 Year Degree
Graduate Degree
Political Affiliation

n

%

22
117
189
108
93
50

3.8
20.2
32.6
18.7
16.1
8.6

329
250

56.8
43.2

5
13
10
21
457
73

.9
2.2
1.7
3.6
78.9
12.6

18
48
144
66
178
125

3.1
8.3
24.9
11.4
30.7
21.6
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Democratic
Republican
Independent
Green
Constitution
Libertarian
Other
None
Income Level
$0-$9,999
$10,000 to $24,999
$25,000 to $49,999
$50,000 to $74,999
$75,000 to $99,999
$100,000 to $124,999
$125,000 to $149,999
$150,000 to $174,999
$175,000 to $199,999
$200,000 and up
Prefer not to answer
Religious Identity
Protestant
Mormon
Scientology
Atheist

289
81
43
4
1
28
13
120

49.9
14.0
7.4
.7
.2
4.8
2.2
20.7

11
36
111
108
96
66
42
27
20
36
26

1.9
6.2
19.2
18.7
16.6
11.4
7.3
4.7
3.5
6.2
4.5

64
73
69
373

7.6
8.7
8.2
44.3

The convenience non-probability sampling method used to recruit participants
means that the sample may not be truly representative of US voters belonging to each
religious identity and as such cannot be generalized to all voters of each religious
category. This limitation may result in low external validity. However, while the use of
the Internet may unintentionally eliminate low-income participants, it should provide an
overall larger range of participants from across the United States.
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Results
Descriptive Statistics
The sample consisted of 579 US residents of legal voting age. Table 2 displays
the means and standard deviations for participant religious identity compared to the
candidate type evaluated in the survey.
Table 2
Means and Standard Deviations for Religious Identity and Candidate Type

Religious
Identity
Protestant

Mormon

Scientologist

Atheist

Total

Candidate Type

Mean

SD

N

Protestant
Mormon
Scientologist
Atheist
Total
Protestant
Mormon
Scientologist
Atheist
Total
Protestant
Mormon
Scientologist
Atheist
Total
Protestant
Mormon
Scientologist
Atheist
Total
Protestant
Mormon
Scientologist
Atheist
Total

5.625
3.125
2.625
3.250
3.656
5.813
6.053
4.000
4.105
4.959
5.389
4.438
5.471
5.500
5.217
5.193
4.052
3.222
6.833
4.743
5.336
4.250
3.501
5.861
4.706

1.857
2.029
1.500
1.732
2.102
1.106
1.747
1.700
1.595
1.813
1.577
1.460
1.972
1.855
1.748
1.353
1.788
1.860
1.769
2.160
1.424
1.920
1.963
2.200
2.101

16
16
16
16
64
16
19
19
19
73
18
16
17
18
69
93
97
99
84
373
143
148
151
137
579

93
Evaluation of Statistical Assumptions
The assumptions of the factorial ANOVA include the necessity of the dependent
variables to be measured at the interval or ratio level. As all dependent variables are
measured on a numbered scale (e.g., voter likelihood scale) or a semantic differential
scale (e.g., 7 points of intensity), the dependent variables are interval (i.e., there is a
measurable distance between each value of the dependent variables), fulfilling this
assumption. The second assumption of “goodness of fit” and the third assumption of
homoscedasticity is not met in this data set. Kolmogorov-Simonov test as well as
Levene’s test does not show the data to be evenly distributed. However, some
statisticians suggest that normality testing is problematic because (1) in large samples
they can be significant even for small and unimportant effects and (2) in small samples
they will lack power to detect violations of assumptions (Ruxton, Wilkinson, &
Neuhäuser, 2015). With this in mind, the data will be interpreted with caution and further
analyses of the demographic data will be conducted to ensure random assignment
occurred.
The fourth assumption is that no multicollinearity occurs. Multicollinearity
occurs when the independent variables are intercorrelated, thus not being independent
from each other. As the independent variables are participant and candidate religious
affiliation, this assumption has been met. A participant’s religious identity is not
dependent upon the candidate’s religious identity and one does not imply the other. They
may interact with one another, but these variables are not correlated and are two distinct
independent variables. The independent variables are nominal and religious identities are
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coded 1-4 for participants (1 for Protestant, 2 for Mormon, 3 for Scientology, 4 for
atheist) and 1-4 for candidates (1 for Protestant, 2 for Mormon, 3 for Scientologist, 4 for
atheist).
Factorial ANOVA Analyses
The four research questions in the study were tested using four separate 4 X 4
factorial ANOVA analyses, one for each of the dependent variables. An initial series of
four separate 4 X 4 factorial analyses (participant religious identity by candidate type)
were conducted to evaluate the hypotheses. Voting intention and the three semantic
scales were the dependent variables. Each analysis was a 4 (participant religious identity:
Protestant [N = 64], Mormon [N = 73], Scientologist [N = 69], atheist [N = 373]) X 4
(candidate type: Protestant [N = 204], Mormon [N = 206], Scientologist [N = 215], and
atheist [N = 373]) factorial ANOVA with one of the four dependent variables and with
alpha set at .05.
In each of the four 4 X 4 factorial ANOVAs, significant interactions were found,
necessitating a closer look at the independent variables through simple effect analyses.
The Bonferroni post hoc correction was selected for follow up to minimize Type I errors
given the large number of comparisons that were made. This is because the probability
of a false-positive result is more likely with multiple pairwise tests, increasing with each
hypothesis tested; the Bonferroni correction will reduce the odds of this occurring,
although it may reduce the overall power of the statistical findings.
Research Questions 1 and 2. Research questions one and two were both
answered with a 4 X 4 factorial ANOVA with voting intention as the dependent variable.
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Research Question 1: Do atheists face greater discrimination when seeking
political office than candidates who identify as mainstream Christian (Protestant), nonmainstream Christian (Mormon), or non-Christian (Scientologist) as measured by the
voting likelihood scale (Franks & Scherr, 2014), was answered using the main effect
analyses of the ANOVA.
Research Question 2: Are participants more likely to vote for a candidate based
on ideological similarity, as predicted by social identity theory and measured by the
voting likelihood scale (Franks and Scherr, 2014) was answered using the interaction
effect analyses of the ANOVA. The complete ANOVA results are presented in Table 3,
and a profile plot of candidate type group means x participant religious identity group
with the dependent variable of voting intention appears in Figure 1.
Table 3
Religious Identity by Candidate Type for Voting Likelihood
Source
Religion
Candidate
Religion x
Candidate
Error
Total

SS
96.754
130.741
339.027

df
3
3
9

MS
32.251
43.580
37.670

1632.411
15377.000

563
579

2.899

F
11.123
15.030
12.992

p
<.001
<.001
<.001

η2
.056
.074
.172
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Figure 1. Voting Likelihood Score Means by Religious Identity and Candidate Type

The main effect for participant religious identity was statistically significant and
represents a small effect size (F(3, 563) = 11.123, p < .001,

= .056), indicating a

significant difference between Protestant (M = 3.656, SE = .213) Mormon (M = 4.993, SE
= .200) Scientologist (M = 5.199, SE = .205) and atheist (M = 4.825, SE = .088) religious
identities and participant voting intention. Means plots for religious identity main effect
by voting intention are presented in Figure 2.
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Figure 2. Means Plots for Voting Likelihood and Religious Identity

The main effect for candidate type was significant and represents a medium effect
size (F(3, 563) = 15.030, p < .001,

= .074), indicating a significant difference between

Protestant (M = 5.505, SE = .186) Mormon (M = 4.417, SE = .185) Scientologist (M =
3.829, SE = .183) and atheist (M = 4.922, SE = .182) candidate types and participant
voting intention. Means plots for candidate type main effect by voting intention are
presented in Figure 3.
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Figure 3. Means Plots for Voting Likelihood and Candidate Type

The analysis also showed a significant religion x candidate interaction for voting
intention (F(9, 563) = 12.992, p < .001), which represents a large effect size (

= .172).

An analysis of simple effects showed that there was no statistically significant difference
across participant groups voting for the Protestant candidate. When participants were
presented with the Mormon candidate, a significant difference was noted for all group
comparisons except for Scientologist participants when compared to atheist participants.
When participants were presented with the Scientologist candidate, a significant
difference was noted for all group comparisons except for Protestant compared to atheist
and Mormon compared to atheist participants. When participants were presented with
the atheist candidate, a significant difference was noted for all group comparisons except
for Protestant compared to Mormon participants. A complete table of comparisons can
be found in Table 4.
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Table 4
Simple Effect Pairwise Comparisons for Voting Likelihood

Candidate

Comparisons

Protestant

Protestant vs.
Mormon
Protestant vs.
Scientologist
Protestant vs.
Atheist
Mormon vs.
Scientologist
Mormon vs.
Atheist
Scientologist
vs. Atheist
Protestant vs.
Mormon
Protestant vs.
Scientologist
Protestant vs.
Atheist
Mormon vs.
Scientologist
Mormon vs.
Atheist
Scientologist
vs. Atheist
Protestant vs.
Mormon
Protestant vs.
Scientologist
Protestant vs.
Atheist
Mormon vs.
Scientologist
Mormon vs.
Atheist
Scientologist
vs. Atheist

Mormon

Scientologist

95% CI
Lower
Upper
Bound
Bound

Mean
Difference
(I-J)
-.188

SE

p

.602

.756

-1.370

.995

.236

.585

.687

-.913

1.385

.431

.461

.350

-.474

1.337

.424

.585

.469

-.726

1.573

.619

.461

.180

-.289

1.524

.195

.438

.656

-.666

1.057

-2.928*

.578

<.001

-4.062

-1.793

-1.313*

.602

.030

-2.495

-.130

-.927*

.459

.044

-1.829

-.024

1.615*

.578

.005

.480

2.750

2.001*

.427

<.001

1.162

2.840

.386

.459

.401

-.517

1.288

-1.375*

.578

.018

-2.510

-.240

-2.846*

.593

<.001

-4.011

-1.681

-.597

.459

.194

-1.498

.304

-1.471*

.568

.010

-2.587

-.354

.778

.426

.069

-.060

1.615

2.248*

.447

<.001

1.370

3.126
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Atheist

Protestant vs.
Mormon
Protestant vs.
Scientologist
Protestant vs.
Atheist
Mormon vs.
Scientologist
Mormon vs.
Atheist
Scientologist
vs. Atheist

-.855

.578

.139

-1.990

.280

-2.250*

.585

<.001

-3.399

-1.101

-3.583*

.464

<.001

-4.496

-2.671

-1.395*

.560

.013

-2.495

-.295

-2.728*

.433

<.001

-3.578

-1.878

-1.333*

.442

.003

-2.202

-4.65

* p < 0.05

Pairwise mean comparisons using Bonferroni’s post hoc test indicated that
religious identity significantly influenced voting intention, depending on the candidate
type presented. The post hoc test results are presented in Table 5 and Table 6.
Table 5
Religious Identity by Voting Likelihood Bonferroni Post Hoc Test

p

95% CI
Lower
Upper
Bound
Bound

.29159

<.001

-2.0747

-.5306

-1.5611*

.29551

<.001

-2.3435

-.7787

-1.0864*
-.2585

.23039
.28590

<.001
1.000

-1.6964
-1.0154

-.4764
.4985

.2163
.4748

.21793
.22315

1.000
.203

-.3607
-.1160

.7933
1.0656

Comparisons

Mean
Difference (I-J)

Protestant vs.
Mormon
Protestant vs.
Scientologist
Protestant vs. Atheist
Mormon vs.
Scientologist
Mormon vs. Atheist
Scientologist vs.
Atheist
* p < 0.05

-1.3027*

SE
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Table 6
Candidate Type by Voting Likelihood Bonferroni Post Hoc Test

Comparisons

Mean
Difference (I-J)

Protestant vs.
Mormon
Protestant vs.
Scientologist
Protestant vs. Atheist
Mormon vs.
Scientologist
Mormon vs. Atheist
Scientologist vs.
Atheist
* p < 0.05

1.0857*

95% CI
Upper
Bound

p

Lower
Bound

.19967

<.001

.5570

1.6143

1.8257*

.19869

<.001

1.2997

2.3518

-.5256
.7401*

.20357
.19696

.060 -1.0646
.2186
<.001

.0133
1.2615

-1.6113*
-2.3514*

.20188
.20091

<.001 -2.1458
<.001 -2.8833

-1.0768
-1.8194

SE

Protestant participants expressed a greater intention to vote for Protestant
candidates (M = 5.625, SE = .426) and the lowest intention to vote for Scientologist
candidates (M = 2.625, SE = .426) with Mormon (M = 3.125, SE = .426) averaging
slightly lower than atheist candidates (M = 3.250, SE = .426). A means plot for
Protestant participant by candidate type for Voting Likelihood can be found in Figure 4.
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Figure 4. Means Plots for Protestant Participants by Candidate Type for Voting
Likelihood

Mormon participants expressed the highest intention to vote for Mormon
candidates (M = 6.053, SE = .391) with Protestant candidates measuring only slightly
lower than the Mormon candidate (M = 5.812, SE = .426) and the lowest intention for
Scientologist candidates (M = 4.000, SE = .388) with atheist candidates only slightly
greater than the Scientologist candidate (M = 4.000, SE = .391). A means plot for
Mormon participant by candidate type for Voting Likelihood can be found in Figure 5.
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Figure 5. Means Plots for Mormon Participants by Candidate Type for Voting
Likelihood

Scientologist participants expressed a slightly higher intention to vote for atheist
candidates (M = 5.500, SE = .401) than Scientologist candidates (M = 5.471, SE = .413)
with Protestant candidates slightly below (M = 5.389, SE = .401) and the lowest intention
to vote for Mormon candidates (M = 4.437, SE = 4.26). A means plot for Scientologist
participant by candidate type for Voting Likelihood can be found in Figure 6.
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Figure 6. Means Plots for Scientologist Participants by Candidate Type for Voting
Likelihood

Atheist participants expressed the greatest intention to vote for atheist candidates
(M = 6.833, SE = .186) followed by the Protestant candidates (M = 5.194, SE = .177) a
lower intention to vote for Mormon candidates (M = 4.052, SE = .173) and the lowest
intention to vote for Scientologist candidates (M = 3.222, SE = .171). A means plot for
atheist participant by candidate type for Voting Likelihood can be found in Figure 7.
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Figure 7. Means Plots for Atheist Participants by Candidate Type for Voting Likelihood

This analysis demonstrated a significant difference for participant voting intention
based on candidate-type as measured by the voting likelihood scale (Franks & Scherr,
2014). However, the main effect results for candidate type indicated that the
Scientologist and Mormon candidates performed more poorly than the atheist candidate.
As a result of the participant group size disparity, there was concern that the
atheist candidate may present more favorably than the candidate would have if the atheist
participant group were not disproportionately larger than the other participant groups.
However, when an analysis was conducted excluding the atheist participants, the
Scientologist (M = 4.032, SE = .236) and Mormon (M = 4.538, SE = .238) candidates
were still viewed more negatively than the atheist candidate (M = 4.285, SE = .234) by all
groups but their own. Therefore, for research question one, the null hypothesis (Ho1)
was not rejected, as atheists do not face greater discrimination when seeking political

106
office than candidates who identify as mainstream Christian (Protestant), non-mainstream
Christian (Mormon), or non-Christian (Scientologist).
For research question two, all of the participant groups demonstrated the highest
likelihood to vote for their own candidate type, except Scientologists who favored the
atheist candidate slightly more than the Scientologist candidate. Therefore, the
alternative hypothesis (Ha2) for research question 2 is accepted; participants are more
likely to vote for a candidate based on ideological similarity.
Research Question 3. Are participants more likely to rate a candidate with lower
levels of distrust (higher levels of trust) when their ideologies are similar, as predicted by
social identity theory and the socio-functional approach, and as measured by the 7-point
semantic differential scales (Franks & Scherr, 2014)? This research question was
answered with a 4 X 4 factorial ANOVA with distrust as the dependent variable. The
complete ANOVA results are presented in Table 7, and a profile plot of candidate type
group means by participant religious identity group with the dependent variable of
distrust appears in Figure 8. It is important to note that high scores indicate the
participant is more likely to trust this candidate while low scores indicate that the
participant is more likely to distrust this candidate, with a score of 5 representing a
neutral position.
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Table 7
Religious Identity by Candidate Type for Trust
Source
Religion
Candidate
Religion x
Candidate
Error
Total

SS
41.075
41.531
217.558

df
3
3
9

MS
13.692
13.844
24.173

849.253
10820.000

563
579

1.508

F
9.077
9.177
16.025

p
<.001
<.001
<.001

η2
.046
.047
.204

Figure 8. Trust Score Means by Religious Identity and Candidate Type

The main effect for participant religious identity was statistically significant and
represents a small effect size (F(3, 563) = 9.077, p < .001,

= .046), indicating a

difference between Protestant (M = 3.578, SE = .154) Mormon (M = 4.442, SE = .144)
Scientologist (M = 4.546, SE = .148) and atheist (M = 4.037, SE = .064) religious
identities and participant distrust. Means plots for religious identity effect by distrust are
presented in Figure 9.
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Figure 9. Means Plots for Distrust and Religious Identity

The main effect for candidate type was significant and represents a small effect
size (F(3, 563) = 9.177, p < .001,

= .047), indicating a difference between Protestant

(M = 4.649, SE = .134) Mormon (M = 4.250, SE = .133) Scientologist (M = 3.693, SE =
.132) and atheist (M = 4.012, SE = .131) candidate types and participant distrust. Means
plots for candidate type effect by distrust are presented in Figure 10.
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Figure 10. Means Plots for Distrust and Candidate Type

The analysis also showed a significant religion x candidate interaction for trust
(F(9, 563) = 16.025, p < .001) which represents a large effect size (

= .204). An

analysis of simple effects showed a statistically significant difference in distrust/trust
scores for Protestant participants compared to atheist participants when presented with
the Protestant candidate. A moderately significant result was also noted for Mormon
participants compared to atheist participants when presented with the Protestant
candidate. When participants were presented with the Mormon candidate, a significant
difference was noted for Protestant compared to Mormon participants, Mormon
compared to Scientologist participants, and Mormon compared to atheist participants.
When participants were presented with the Scientologist candidate, a significant
difference was noted for all comparison groups except Protestant compared to atheist
participants. When participants were presented with the atheist candidate, a significant
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difference was noted across all group comparisons except Protestant compared to
Mormon participants. A complete table of comparisons can be found in Table 8.

Table 8
Simple Effect Pairwise Comparisons for Trust

Candidate

Comparisons

Protestant

Protestant vs.
Mormon
Protestant vs.
Scientologist
Protestant vs.
Atheist
Mormon vs.
Scientologist
Mormon vs.
Atheist
Scientologist
vs. Atheist
Protestant vs.
Mormon
Protestant vs.
Scientologist
Protestant vs.
Atheist
Mormon vs.
Scientologist
Mormon vs.
Atheist
Scientologist
vs. Atheist
Protestant vs.
Mormon
Protestant vs.
Scientologist
Protestant vs.
Atheist

Mormon

Scientologist

Mean
Difference
(I-J)
.188

SE

p

95% CI
Lower
Upper
Bound
Bound

.434

.666

-.665

1.040

.618

.422

.144

-.211

1.447

.847*

.332

.011

.195

1.500

.431

.422

.308

-.398

1.259

.660*

.332

.048

.007

1.313

.229

.316

.469

-.392

.851

-2.007*

.417

<.001

-2.825

-1.188

-.375

.434

.388

-1.228

.478

-.117

.331

.724

-.768

.534

1.632*

.417

<.001

.813

2.450

1.889*

.308

<.001

1.284

2.495

.258

.331

.437

-.393

.909

-.987*

.417

.018

-1.805

-.168

-2.544*

.428

<.001

-3.384

-1.704

-.240

.331

.469

-.890

.410
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Mormon vs.
Scientologist
Mormon vs.
Atheist
Scientologist
vs. Atheist
Protestant vs.
Mormon
Protestant vs.
Scientologist
Protestant vs.
Atheist
Mormon vs.
Scientologist
Mormon vs.
Atheist
Scientologist
vs. Atheist

Atheist

-1.557*

.410

<.001

-2.363

-.752

.747*

.308

.015

.143

1.351

2.304*

.322

<.001

1.671

2.938

-.651

.417

.119

-1.470

.167

-1.569*

.422

<.001

-2.398

-.741

-2.327*

.335

<.001

-2.985

-1.669

-.918*

.404

.023

-1.712

-.125

-1.676*

.312

<.001

-2.289

-1.063

-.758*

.319

.018

-1.385

-.131

* p < 0.05

Pairwise mean comparisons using Bonferroni’s post hoc test indicated that
religious identity significantly influenced distrust, depending on the candidate type
presented. The post hoc test results are presented in Table 9 and Table 10.
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Table 9
Religious Identity by Trust Bonferroni Post Hoc Test

p

95% CI
Lower
Upper
Bound
Bound

.21032

<.001

-1.4032

-.2897

-.9726*

.21315

<.001

-1.5369

-.4083

-.4112*
-.1261

.16617
.20622

.082
1.000

-.8511
-.6720

-.0288
.4199

.4354
.5614*

.15719
.16095

.035
.003

.0192
.1353

.8516
.9876

Comparisons

Mean
Difference (I-J)

Protestant vs.
Mormon
Protestant vs.
Scientologist
Protestant vs. Atheist
Mormon vs.
Scientologist
Mormon vs. Atheist
Scientologist vs.
Atheist
* p < 0.05

-.8465*

SE

Table 10
Candidate Type by Trust Bonferroni Post Hoc Test

Comparisons

Protestant vs.
Mormon
Protestant vs.
Scientologist
Protestant vs. Atheist
Mormon vs.
Scientologist
Mormon vs. Atheist
Scientologist vs.
Atheist
* p < 0.05

Mean
Difference (I-J)

SE

95% CI
Lower
Upper
Bound
Bound

p

.4126

.14402

.026

.0313

.7939

1.0947*

.14331

<.001

.7153

1.4741

-.1860
.6821*

.14683
.14206

1.000
<.001

-.5747
.3060

.2028
1.0582

-.5985*
-1.2807*

.14561
.14491

<.001
<.001

-.9841
-1.6643

-.2130
-.8970
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Protestant participants expressed more trust for the Protestant candidate (M =
5.062, SE = .307) followed by the Mormon candidate (M = 3.625, SE = .307) the atheist
candidate (M = 2.875, SE = .307) and the lowest levels of trust for the Scientologist
candidate (M = 2.750, SE = .307). A means plot for Protestant participant by candidate
type for distrust can be found in Figure 11.

Figure 11. Means Plots for Protestant Participants by Candidate Type for Distrust

Mormon participants trust the Mormon candidate the most (M = 5.632, SE = .282)
followed by the Protestant candidate (M = 4.875, SE = .307) the Scientologist candidate
(M = 3.737, SE = .282) and with the lowest levels of trust for the atheist candidate (M =
3.526, SE = .282). A means plot for Mormon participant by candidate type for distrust
can be found in Figure 12.
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Figure 12. Means Plots for Mormon Participants by Candidate Type for Distrust

Scientologist participants trust the Scientologist candidate the most (M = 5.294,
SE = .298) followed by the atheist candidate (M = 4.444, SE = .289), then the Protestant
candidate (M = 4.444, SE = .289) with the lowest levels of trust for the Mormon
candidate (M = 4.000, SE = .307). A means plot for Scientologist participant by
candidate type for distrust can be found in Figure 13.
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Figure 13. Means Plots for Scientologist Participants by Candidate Type for Distrust

Atheist participants trusted the atheist candidate the most (M = 5.202, SE = .134)
with the Protestant candidate coming next (M = 4.215, SE = .127) followed by the
Mormon candidate (M = 3.742, SE = .125) with the lowest levels of trust for the
Scientologist candidate (M = 2.990, SE = .123). A means plot for atheist participant by
candidate type for distrust can be found in Figure 14.
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Figure 14. Means Plots for Atheist Participants by Candidate Type for Distrust

This analysis demonstrated that all participants viewed the ideologically similar
candidate the most trustworthy, therefore the alternative hypothesis (Ha3) for research
question 3 is accepted: Participants will be more likely to rate a candidate with lower
levels of distrust (higher levels of trust) when their ideologies are similar, as predicted by
social identity theory and the socio-functional approach, as measured by the 7-point
semantic differential scales (Franks & Scherr, 2014).
Research Question 4. Are participants more likely to rate a candidate with lower
levels of disgust when their ideologies are similar, as predicted by social identity theory
and the socio-functional approach, as measured by the 7-point semantic differential scales
(Franks & Scherr, 2014)? This research question was answered with a 4 X 4 factorial
ANOVA with disgust as the dependent variable. The complete ANOVA results are
presented in Table 11, and a profile plot of candidate type group means by participant
religious identity group with the dependent variable of disgust appears in Figure 15.
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Table 11

Religious Identity by Candidate Type for Disgust
Source
Religion
Candidate
Religion x
Candidate
Error
Total

SS
35.947
29.637
187.041

df
3
3
9

MS
11.982
9.879
20.782

722.105
12552.000

563
579

1.283

F
9.342
7.702
16.203

p
<.001
<.001
<.001

η2
.047
.039
.206

Figure 15. Disgust Score Means by Religious Identity and Candidate Type

The main effect for participant religious identity was statistically significant and
represents a small effect size (F(3, 563) = 9.342, p < .001,

= .047), indicating a

difference between Protestants (M = 3.828, SE = .142), Mormons (M = 4.595, SE = .133)
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Scientologists (M = 4.806, SE = .137) and atheists (M = 4.516, SE = .059). Means plots
for religious identity main effect by disgust are presented in Figure 16.

Figure 16. Means Plots for Disgust and Religious Identity

The main effect for candidate type was significant and represents a small effect
size (F(3, 814) = 12.617, p < .001,

= .044), indicating a difference between Protestant

(M = 4.833, SE = .124) Mormon (M = 4.396, SE = .123) Scientologist (M = 4.008, SE =
.121) and atheist (M = 4.508, SE = .121) candidate types. Means plots for candidate type
main effect by disgust are presented in Figure 17.
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Figure 17. Means Plots for Disgust and Candidate Type

The analysis showed a significant religion x candidate interaction for disgust (F(9,
563) = 16.203, p <.001), which represents a large effect size (

= .206). An analysis of

simple effects showed that when participants were presented with a Protestant candidate,
a statistically significant difference in disgust scores was observed for Mormon compared
to atheist participants. No statistically significant difference in disgust scores was found
across all other participant group comparisons for the Protestant candidate. When
participants were presented with the Mormon candidate, a significant difference was
noted for Protestant compared to Mormon participants, Mormon compared to
Scientologist participants, and Mormon compared to atheist participants. When
participants were presented with the Scientologist candidate, a significant difference was
noted for all participant group comparisons except for Protestant compared to atheist
participants and Mormon compared to atheist participants. When participants were
presented with the atheist candidate, a significant difference was noted for all group
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comparisons except Protestant compared to Mormon participants. A complete table of
comparisons can be found in Table 12.

Table 12
Simple Effect Pairwise Comparisons for Disgust
95% CI
Candidate

Comparisons

Protestant

Protestant vs.
Mormon
Protestant vs.
Scientologist
Protestant vs.
Atheist
Mormon vs.
Scientologist
Mormon vs.
Atheist
Scientologist
vs. Atheist
Protestant vs.
Mormon
Protestant vs.
Scientologist
Protestant vs.
Atheist
Mormon vs.
Scientologist
Mormon vs.
Atheist
Scientologist
vs. Atheist
Protestant vs.
Mormon
Protestant vs.
Scientologist
Protestant vs.
Atheist

Mormon

Scientologist

Mean
Difference
(I-J)
.188

SE

p

Lower
Bound

Upper
Bound

.400

.640

-.599

.974

.694

.389

.075

-.070

1.459

.788*

.307

.010

.186

1.390

.507

.389

.193

-.257

1.271

.600

.307

.051

-.002

1.202

.093

.292

.749

-.480

.666

-1.451*

.384

<.001

-2.205

-.696

-.625

.400

.119

-1.411

.161

-.260

.306

.396

-.860

.341

.826*

.384

.032

.071

1.580

1.191*

.284

<.001

.633

1.749

.365

.306

.232

-.235

.966

-1.095*

.384

.005

-1.850

-.341

-2.114*

.394

<.001

-2.889

-1.339

-.574

.305

.061

-1.173

.026
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Mormon vs.
Scientologist
Mormon vs.
Atheist
Scientologist
vs. Atheist
Protestant vs.
Mormon
Protestant vs.
Scientologist
Protestant vs.
Atheist
Mormon vs.
Scientologist
Mormon vs.
Atheist
Scientologist
vs. Atheist

Atheist

-1.019*

.378

.007

-1.761

-.276

.522

.284

.067

-.036

1.079

1.540*

.297

<.001

.956

2.124

-.707

.384

.066

-1.462

.048

-1.868*

.389

<.001

-2.632

-1.104

-2.705*

.309

<.001

-3.312

-2.099

-1.161*

.373

.002

-1.892

-.429

-1.998*

.288

<.001

-2.563

-1.433

-.837*

.294

.005

-1.415

-.260

* p < 0.05

Pairwise mean comparisons using Bonferroni’s post hoc test indicated that
religious identity significantly influenced disgust, depending on the candidate type
presented. The post hoc test results are presented in Table 13 and Table 14.
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Table 13
Religious Identity by Disgust Bonferroni Post Hoc Test

Comparisons

Protestant vs.
Mormon
Protestant vs.
Scientologist
Protestant vs. Atheist
Mormon vs.
Scientologist
Mormon vs. Atheist
Scientologist vs.
Atheist
* p < 0.05

Mean
Difference (IJ)
-.7472*

SE

95% CI
Lower
Upper
Bound
Bound

p

.19393

<.001

-1.2607

-.2338

-.9835*

.19654

<.001

-1.5038

-.4631

-.6357*
-.2363

.15323
.19015

<.001
1.000

.2338
-.7397

1.2607
.2672

.1115
.3478

.14494
.14842

1.000
.117

-.2722
-.0452

.4953
.7407

Table 14
Candidate Type by Disgust Bonferroni Post Hoc Test

Comparisons

Protestant vs.
Mormon
Protestant vs.
Scientologist
Protestant vs. Atheist
Mormon vs.
Scientologist
Mormon vs. Atheist
Scientologist vs.
Atheist
* p < 0.05

Mean
SE
Difference (I-J)

95% CI
Lower
Upper
Bound
Bound

p

.3929*

.13280

<.001

.0413

.7445

.8148*

.13215

<.001

.4649

1.1647

-.5604*
.4219*

.13539
.13100

<.001
.008

-.9189
.0751

-.2019
.7687

-.9533*
-1.3752*

.13427
.13363

<.001
<.001

-1.3088
-1.7290

-.5978
-1.0214
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Protestant participants were the most disgusted by the Scientologist candidate (M
= 3.063, SE = .283) with the atheist candidate faring only slightly better (M = 3.188, SE =
.283); the Mormon candidate was not viewed as appealing but more so than the previous
two candidates (M = 3.812, SE = .283), and the Protestant candidate was viewed as the
most appealing candidate by Protestant participants (M = 5.250, SE = .283). A means
plot for Protestant participant by candidate type for disgust can be found in Figure 18.

Figure 18. Means Plots for Protestant Participants by Candidate Type for Disgust

Mormon participants viewed the atheist candidate with the most disgust (M =
3.895, SE = .260) with the Scientologist candidate scoring as less disgusting but still
highly unappealing (M = 4.158, SE = .260), while the Protestant candidate was viewed as
slightly appealing (M = 5.063, SE = .283) and the Mormon candidate was viewed as
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highly appealing (M = 5.263, SE = .260). A means plot for Mormon participant by
candidate type for disgust can be found in Figure 19.

Figure 19. Means Plots for Mormon Participants by Candidate Type for Disgust

Scientologist participants rated the Mormon candidate as the least appealing (M =
4.438, SE = .283) followed by the Protestant candidate (M = 4.556, SE = .267), the atheist
candidate (M = 5.056, SE = .267), and the Scientologist candidate as the most appealing
(M = 5.176, SE = .275). A means plot for Scientologist participant by candidate type for
disgust can be found in Figure 20.
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Figure 20. Means Plots for Scientologist Participants by Candidate Type for Disgust

Atheist participants viewed the atheist candidate as highly appealing (M = 5.893,
SE = .124) followed by the Protestant candidate (M = 4.462, SE = .117) the Mormon
candidate (M = 4.072, SE = .115), and the Scientologist candidate was rated as highly
disgusting to atheist participants (M = 3.636, SE = .114). A means plot for atheist
participant by candidate type for disgust can be found in Figure 21.
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Figure 21. Means Plots for Atheist Participants by Candidate Type for Disgust

This analysis demonstrated a significant difference in participant disgust levels
based on participant religious identity and candidate type as measured by the 7-point
semantic differential scale for disgust (Franks & Scherr, 2014). Therefore, the alternative
hypothesis (Ha4) for research question 4, i.e., participants will be more likely to rate a
candidate with lower levels of disgust when their ideologies are similar, as predicted by
social identity theory and the socio-functional approach, is accepted.
Research Question 5. Are participants more likely to rate a candidate with lower
levels of fear when their ideologies are similar, as predicted by social identity theory and
the socio-functional approach, as measured by the 7-point semantic differential scales
(Franks & Scherr, 2014)? This research question was answered with a 4 X 4 factorial
ANOVA with fear as the dependent variable. The complete ANOVA results are
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presented in Table 15, and a profile plot of candidate type group means by participant
religious identity group with the dependent variable of fear appears in Figure 22.

Table 15
Religious Identity by Candidate Type for Fear
Source
Religion
Candidate
Religion x
Candidate
Error
Total

SS
41.063
25.315
175.880

df
3
3
9

MS
13.688
8.438
19.542

802.097
11379.000

563
579

1.386

F
9.607
5.923
13.717

p
<.001
.001
<.001

η2
.049
.031
.180

Figure 22. Fear Score Means by Religious Identity and Candidate Type

The main effect for participant religious identity was statistically significant and
represents a small effect size (F(3, 563) = 9.607, p < .001,

= .049), indicating a
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difference between Protestants (M = 3.656, SE = .149) Mormons (M = 4.524, SE = .140)
Scientologists (M = 4.672, SE = .144) and atheists (M = 4.201, SE = .062). Means plots
for religious identity main effect by fear are presented in Figure 23.

Figure 23. Means Plots for Fear and Religious Identity

The main effect for candidate type was significant and represents a small effect
size (F(3, 563) = 5.923, p = .001,

= .031), indicating a difference between Protestant

(M = 4.635, SE = .131) Mormon (M = 4.270, SE = .129) Scientologist (M = 3.866, SE =
.128) and atheist (M = 4.282, SE = .128) candidate types. Mean plots for candidate type
main effect by fear are presented in Figure 24.
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Figure 24. Means Plots for Fear and Candidate Type

The analysis showed a significant religion x candidate interaction for disgust (F(9,
563) = 13.717, p <.001), which represents a large effect size (

= .180). An analysis of

simple effects showed that when participants were presented with a Protestant candidate,
a statistically significant difference in fear scores was observed for Protestant compared
to atheist participants and Mormon compared to atheist participants. No statistically
significant difference in fear scores was found across all other participant group
comparisons for the Protestant candidate. When participants were presented with the
Mormon candidate, a significant difference was noted for Protestant compared to atheist
participants and Mormon compared to Scientologist participants. When participants were
presented with the Scientologist candidate, a significant difference was noted for all
group comparisons, except Protestant compared to atheist participants. When
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participants were presented with the atheist candidate, a significant difference was noted
for Protestant compared to Mormon participants and Mormon compared to Scientologist
participants. A complete table of comparisons can be found in Table 16.

Table 16
Simple Effect Pairwise Comparisons for Fear
95% CI
Candidate

Comparisons

Protestant

Protestant vs.
Mormon
Protestant vs.
Scientologist
Protestant vs.
Atheist
Mormon vs.
Scientologist
Mormon vs.
Atheist
Scientologist
vs. Atheist
Protestant vs.
Mormon
Protestant vs.
Scientologist
Protestant vs.
Atheist
Mormon vs.
Scientologist
Mormon vs.
Atheist
Scientologist
vs. Atheist
Protestant vs.
Mormon
Protestant vs.
Scientologist

Mormon

Scientologist

Mean
Difference
(I-J)
.063

SE

p

Lower
Bound

Upper
Bound

.422

.882

-.766

.891

.667

.410

.105

-.139

1.472

.731*

.323

.024

.097

1.366

.604

.410

.141

-.201

1.410

.669*

.323

.039

-.034

1.303

.065

.307

.834

-.539

.668

-1.826*

.405

<.001

-2.621

-.696

-1.188*

.422

.005

-2.016

-.359

-.315

.322

.328

-.948

.318

.638

.405

.116

-.157

1.434

1.511*

.299

<.001

.922

2.099

.872*

.322

.007

.240

1.505

-1.053*

.405

.010

-1.848

-.257

-2.118*

.416

<.001

-2.934

-1.301

131
Protestant vs.
Atheist
Mormon vs.
Scientologist
Mormon vs.
Atheist
Scientologist
vs. Atheist
Protestant vs.
Mormon
Protestant vs.
Scientologist
Protestant vs.
Atheist
Mormon vs.
Scientologist
Mormon vs.
Atheist
Scientologist
vs. Atheist

Atheist

-.293

.322

.363

-.925

.339

-1.065*

.398

.008

-1.848

-.282

.760*

.299

.011

.172

1.347

1.825*

.313

<.001

1.209

2.440

-.655

.405

.107

-1.450

.141

-1.424*

.410

.001

-2.229

-.618

-2.301*

.326

<.001

-2.940

-1.661

-.769

.393

.051

-1.540

.002

-1.646*

.303

<.001

-2.242

-1.050

-.877*

.310

.005

-1.486

-.268

* p < 0.05

Pairwise mean comparisons using Bonferroni’s post hoc test indicated that
religious identity significantly influenced fear of a candidate, depending on the candidate
type presented. The post hoc test results are presented in Table 17 and Table 18.
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Table 17
Religious Identity by Fear Bonferroni Post Hoc Test

Comparisons

Protestant vs.
Mormon
Protestant vs.
Scientologist
Protestant vs. Atheist
Mormon vs.
Scientologist
Mormon vs. Atheist
Scientologist vs.
Atheist
* p < 0.05

Mean
Difference (I-J)

95% CI
Lower
Upper
Bound
Bound

SE

p

-.8506*

.20439

<.001

-1.3918

-.3094

-1.0104*

.20714

<.001

-1.5589

-.4620

-.4939*
-.1598

.16149
.20041

.014
1.000

-.9215
-.6904

-.0663
.3708

.3567
.5165*

.15276
.15642

.119
.006

-.0477
.1024

.7612
.9307

Table 18
Candidate Type by Fear Bonferroni Post Hoc Test

Comparisons

Mean
Difference (I-J)

Protestant vs. Mormon
.4268*
Protestant vs.
.8707*
Scientologist
Protestant vs. Atheist
-.4423*
Mormon vs.
.4438*
Scientologist
Mormon vs. Atheist
-.8692*
Scientologist vs.
-1.3130*
Atheist
* p < 0.05

SE

p

95% CI
Lower
Upper
Bound
Bound

.13996
.13928

.014
<.001

.0562
.5019

.7974
1.2394

.14270
.13806

.012
.008

-.8201
.0783

-.0645
.8094

.14151
.14083

<.001
<.001

-1.2438
-1.6859

-.4945
-.9401

133
Protestant participants viewed the Scientologist candidate as the most threatening
(M = 3.000, SE = .298) with the atheist candidate slightly less threatening (M = 3.188, SE
= .298) followed by the Mormon candidate (M = 3.438, SE = .298), scoring the Protestant
candidate as more comforting (M = 5.000, SE = .298). A means plot for Protestant
participant by candidate type for fear can be found in Figure 25.

Figure 25. Means Plots for Protestant Participants by Candidate Type for Fear

Mormon participants viewed the atheist candidate as the most threatening (M =
3.842, SE = .274) followed by the Scientologist candidate (M = 4.053, SE = .274) then
the Protestant candidate (M = 4.938, SE = .298) and the Mormon candidate viewed as the
most comforting (M = 5.263, SE = .274). A means plot for Mormon participant by
candidate type for fear can be found in Figure 26.
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Figure 26. Means Plots for Mormon Participants by Candidate Type for Fear

Scientologist participants scored the Protestant candidate as the most threatening
of the four (M = 4.333, SE = .281) followed by the Mormon candidate (M = 4.625, SE =
.298) then the atheist candidate (M = 4.611, SE = .281) and the Scientologist candidate
scoring as the most comforting option (M = 5.118, SE = .289). A means plot for
Scientologist participant by candidate type for fear can be found in Figure 27.
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Figure 27. Means Plots for Scientologist Participants by Candidate Type for Fear

Atheist participants scored the atheist candidate as the most comforting (M =
5.488, SE = .130) followed by the Protestant candidate (M = 4.269, SE = .124) then the
Mormon candidate (M = 3.753, SE = .121) with the Scientologist candidate being scored
as the most threatening (M = 3.293, SE = .120). A means plot for atheist participant by
candidate type for fear can be found in Figure 28.
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Figure 28. Means Plots for Atheist Participants by Candidate Type for Fear

This analysis demonstrated a significant difference in participant fear levels based
on participant religious identity and candidate type as measured by the 7-point semantic
differential scale for fear (Franks & Scherr, 2014). Therefore, the alternative hypothesis
(Ha5) for research question 5: Are participants more likely to rate a candidate with lower
levels of fear when their ideologies are similar, as predicted by social identity theory and
the socio-functional approach, and as measured by the 7-point semantic differential scales
(Franks & Scherr, 2014) is accepted.
Summary
Four separate 4 X 4 factorial ANOVAs were conducted to determine if atheists
faced greater levels of discrimination when seeking public office than candidates with
other religious affiliations; the emotional underpinnings of the potential discrimination
was also examined. The independent variables in each analysis showed a significant
interaction effect, demonstrating that while atheists are viewed less favorably by
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mainstream religious groups, Scientologists are in some cases viewed just as poorly or
worse. Consistent with social identity theory, groups typically showed more preference
and more positive emotional ratings for groups who were ideologically similar. Chapter
5 will provide an interpretation of the findings, a discussion of the possible implications
for social change, and recommendations for future research.
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
Introduction
The aim of this study was to assess the comparative electability of atheist political
candidates with candidates from other nontraditional religious backgrounds (i.e., Mormon
and Scientologist) using multiple factorial ANOVA analyses. Previous research has
found that atheists are heavily discriminated against, especially when running for office,
and that the only candidates that may face worse discrimination when running for office
are those often labeled as belonging to a cult (Cragun et al., 2012a; Lalich, 2009; Olson,
2006). The results demonstrated that participants were more likely to vote for candidates
who shared similar religious affiliations and felt stronger negative emotions toward
candidates the more dissimilar they were to the participant. While participants did not
always rate the atheist candidate as the least favorable among candidate options, simple
effects analysis suggested that candidates of nonmainstream religious affiliations (i.e.,
Mormon and Scientologist) would face greater challenges seeking public office than
candidates belonging to mainstream religious groups (i.e., Protestant). This chapter
interprets these findings, the limitations of the study, future research recommendations,
and the implications for positive social change.
Interpretation of the Findings
The data collected and analyzed for this study not only helped support past
research but also provided new insight into directions for future research. Each
participant was presented with one of four political candidates, selected randomly; all
four political candidates were identical, differing only in their religious affiliation.
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Because of the mainstream acceptance of Protestantism, the Protestant candidate was
expected to be viewed favorably across all groups and served as a control for the study
(Gervais, 2013; Gervais, 2014; Gervais et al., 2011). The atheist candidate was not
expected to be viewed favorably, as research on atheists has found that the majority of
people do not view atheists as trustworthy or moral (Gervais, 2013; Gervais, 2014;
Gervais et al., 2011). The Scientologist candidate was also not expected to be viewed
favorably as this minority religious group is often referred to pejoratively by outsiders as
a cult (Doherty, 2014; Gilbert, 2016; McAllister, 2013; Thurm, 2015). The term cult is
used pejoratively to demean smaller religious groups whose practices are outside the
mainstream (Olson, 2006). Expectations for the Mormon candidate were unclear, as
despite outgroup labeling of Mormons as a cult, Mormons are still considered a Christian
denomination, albeit a small, fringe one (Baker & Campbell, 2010; Smith, 2014; Smith,
2016).
Previous research has shown that atheists are highly discriminated against, but
few studies have examined the comparative favorability for political office of other fringe
religious groups often labeled “cult” (e.g., Scientologists and Mormons (Greig, 2017;
Harrison, 2015). This study is informed by social identity theory, which posits that
groups are an important source of self-esteem and pride, giving individuals a sense of
belonging; however, this also often creates an “us” versus “them” mentality where
individuals categorize people based on group membership, in this case, religious
affiliation (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). The result of this
ingroup/outgroup thinking is that ingroup members stereotype outgroups, exaggerating
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their differences while ignoring their similarities (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Tajfel &
Turner, 1986). As such, the similarity of the participant to the candidate was expected to
play a role in the scores the candidate received as predicted by social identity theory. The
use of religious identities in this study likely primed participants’’ religious group
identity, making it that participants would identify with and therefore prefer similar
candidates while exaggerating differences among dissimilar candidates (Ben-Bassat &
Dahan, 2012; Tajfel, 1970).
Using a 9-point voting likelihood scale (1=no chance, 9=100% likely), candidates
were rated by the participant based on their likelihood to vote for the candidate. Feelings
of distrust, disgust, and fear evoked by the candidate were measured using a 7-point scale
for each emotion with 1 reflecting threat, distrust, or disgust and 7 reflecting comfort,
trust, and appeal felt by the participants. The voting likelihood score provides a measure
to determine discrimination toward a specific religious identity, while the emotional
scores provide additional insight into emotional reactions experienced by participants
toward the respective candidates.
Political Discrimination toward Non-Mainstream Candidates
Across all participant groups, non-mainstream candidates consistently scored
lower on voter preference measures when candidates and participants were ideologically
dissimilar. Only the Protestant candidate was scored over the point of neutrality across
all participant groups, while the Scientologist candidate was the lowest scoring candidate
for all groups except for the Scientologist participants. All other ideologically dissimilar
candidates were rated below the point of neutrality across all participant groups. The

141
preference for candidates similar to themselves was expected and provides support for
social identity theory. However, social identity theory fails to account for some of the
nuance in the data, such as why the Scientologist participants did not prefer their own
candidate to the atheist candidate. System justification theory, which posits that
individuals are likely to have negative views toward their own groups to maintain the
status quo (i.e., maintain equilibrium), may provide one explanation, but that does not
account for why the Scientologist participants preferred the atheist candidate to the
mainstream Protestant candidate (Jost, 2011).
In a political setting, where groups whose values differ are competing for
dominance (i.e., political power to set the national norms), it is expected to find ingroup
favoritism, and as such, groups outside of the mainstream will struggle to achieve
political success (Dunkel & Dutton, 2016; Greenwald & Pettigrew, 2014; Johnson,
Rowatt, & LaBouff, 2012). With this in mind, social dominance theory (Sidanius &
Pratto, 1999) complements social identity theory and helps explain the phenomenon of
ingroup power structures. This theory posits that inequalities between groups are
maintained through institutional discrimination to maintain a social hierarchy, protecting
the power of those who already have it (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Future studies may
want to examine how these theories may further explain political discrimination across
religious identities in the political arena.
Ideological Similarity, Voter Preference, and Emotional Measures
Participant groups typically favored their own ideologically similar candidate,
with the Scientologist participants being the exception. The emotional measures (i.e.,
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trustworthy, fear, and disgust) that accompanied the voter preference scale provided key
insight into why voters may have chosen to rate the candidate as they did. For example,
Protestant participants viewed the Scientologist candidate as the least trustworthy, and
only the Protestant candidate was rated higher than the point of neutrality on the
trustworthy scale. Overall, however, trust measures trended low across most candidates,
with only the ideologically similar candidate per the participant group scoring over the
point of neutrality for each candidate group, although the Protestant candidate trended
higher overall across all groups. This could suggest overall low trust for nonmainstream
candidates ideologically dissimilar across participant groups, or it possibly demonstrates
low trust for political candidates, generally. Further research is necessary to examine
which, or if, distrust for nonmainstream candidates and distrust for political candidates in
general interact to lower trust even further.
Fear and disgust measures were more varied, with greater peaks and valleys
across all groups, suggesting that these emotions waxed and waned depending on which
participant/candidate groups were compared. Protestant and atheist participants viewed
the Scientologist candidate as the most disgusting and toward whom they felt the most
fearful, while the Mormon participants viewed the atheist with the most disgust and fear.
The Scientologist participants viewed the Mormon candidate as the most disgusting but
expressed no fear of any of the candidates, as all scored above the point of neutrality.
However, for the other groups, it appeared that participant disgust and fear were often
similarly scored for each candidate group, suggesting that these two emotions may be
highly correlated, while trust appeared to be the strongest predictor of voting preference.
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The socio-functional approach to prejudice states that specific emotions underlie
and elicit corresponding prejudicial responses (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). Findings from
this study supported all socio-functional hypotheses such that participants expressed
distrust, disgust, and fear for all ideologically dissimilar political candidates based on
nothing more than religious identity. However, despite the data collected within this
study, the emotional measures are still vague in their prejudicial predictions for dissimilar
candidates, in that emotional responses were all negative, but not necessarily predictive in
exactly what emotional responses corresponded with each participant to candidate
pairing. As such future studies need to place a greater focus on methods of examining
how these emotions elicit different responses toward political candidates to provide
further clarity. One method of doing this could be to use an adjective checklist as a
follow up measure to the presentation of different religious candidates, to determine
which emotional words participants are more likely to choose. However, despite the
limitations of the scope of this study, the underlying emotional measures were still clearly
associated with voter preferences toward similar and dissimilar candidates, based on
religious identity.
Limitations of the Study
This study was limited to English speaking US residents of legal voting age with
Internet access. Participants also had to find the study through Reddit or Facebook,
limiting generalizability. Demographic data were collected to help ensure the variability
of the sample; however, there were numerous demographic groups who were under or
overrepresented. For example, less than 4% of participants were under 20, less than 9%
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were over 60, and 78% were white. The use of a between-groups rather than a withingroups design also limits the study, because participants rated only one of four candidate
options, their preferences were not comparative.
The socio-functional approach to prejudice as well as social identity theory were
selected as the most appropriate frameworks for this study. However, other frameworks
have provided insight into the complexity of anti-atheist sentiment and prejudice,
meaning the findings here are limited to the explanatory efficacy of the theories that were
used. For example, social dominance orientation has been linked to many forms of
discrimination based on social hierarchies attempting to maintain the status quo (Feather
& McKee, 2012). Moreover, the values-conflict hypothesis has been used to explain
anti-atheist prejudice as atheists are viewed as a threat to the values of mainstream
religious believers who consider them immoral and view them with disgust (Cook,
Cottrell, and Webster, 2015). Additionally, this study was conducted utilizing a selfreport survey, meaning that participants’ responses may reflect social desirability bias.
Social desirability bias occurs when participants respond in ways they believe will be
viewed favorably rather than risking an honest response that could be viewed negatively
(Garcia & Gustavson, 1997). Response bias may also occur when respondents select
choices based on what they believe the researcher is trying to find (Garcia & Gustavson,
1997). Furthermore, participant responses may vary depending on numerous outside
factors, such as mood at the time the survey was completed. Survey responses were also
limited to those individuals who opted to complete the survey, which may differ from
those who opted not to participate (Garcia & Gustavson, 1997).
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Recommendations
The data from this study presents new and exciting insight into not only antiatheist prejudice in politics, but also other overlooked religious minority groups and the
emotions that underlie people’s perceptions of them. While participants in this study
were given only a single candidate to rate, future studies could present multiple
candidates and allow participants to rank order each candidate in terms of preference.
Rather than narrowly focusing on only three minority and one mainstream religious
groups, future studies could use the same research method but include other group, e.g.,
Catholics (a mainstream Christian denomination), and Wiccans and other pagan religions
currently gaining popularly in the US (Pew Research Center, 2014b). Islam may also be
of interest given the political tensions involving Muslim immigrants (Ghumman & Ryan,
2013; Hauslohner, 2017; Khera & Smith, 2017; Taras, 2013). It may also be worth
exploring perceptions of groups carrying other nonreligious labels, such as agnostic, to
determine what, if any, differences exist; for example, research suggests that agnostic is
perceived as a “softer” label than atheist (Anderson, 2015; Cragun et al., 2012b).
During the data collection phase, many participants sent emails discussing their
own views on the research as it was presented. Many of the atheist participants took
umbrage with the classification of atheism as a religion. The demographic question was
a pre-generated one provided by Survey Monkey; however, many atheists believed
atheism is the absence of a religion rather than a religion. Yet, it was still of interest that
so many atheists felt it important to express their disagreement with this classification.
Furthermore, the survey presented more than a single nonreligious option (i.e., atheism,
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agnosticism, no religion) and there were several respondents who identified more closely
as agnostic or nonreligious than atheist. Previous research has suggested this is due to the
stigma surrounding the label of atheism (Cragun et al., 2012a); however, future research
may want to consider the perceptions associated with each of these labels, what they may
mean to people, and if each experiences prejudice differently. Future research may also
want to examine the ways atheists, in particular, self-identify and the importance of
distinguishing themselves from a religion, per se.
Many emails were also received from individuals identifying as Christian who
took issue with the survey, claiming they felt paranoid about its purpose. Some of the
emails expressed concern that the data would allow Russia to gain more information on
the US while other emails suggested that the scales were unfair because individuals could
not rate the candidates with the information presented. This is noteworthy given that all
the emails from individuals taking issue with some aspect of the survey had been asked to
rate one of the less traditional candidates (e.g., Scientologist or atheist). Many of these
individuals opted not to participate for fear that the study was simply going to make them
“look bad,” which would only occur if the individual felt negatively toward the candidate
to begin with. Future research may want to examine Christian participants’ reluctance to
participate in a political survey, including their concerns over being perceived poorly for
having participated.
Future studies could also examine religious prejudice in politics through other
religious constructs (e.g., intrinsic or extrinsic orientation) where intrinsic religious
orientation is belief in living by the letter, i.e., doctrinaire, while extrinsic religious
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orientation implicates personal motives that lie outside of religion such as social
acceptance (Allport & Ross, 1967). Studies have found that each is associated with
different types of discrimination; exploring this in the context of the current study may
provide new insight into religious discrimination in politics (Allport & Ross, 1967;
Herek, 1987).
Studies have also found that priming analytic thinking increased acceptance of
secular ideas and reduced prejudice towards atheists (Franks, 2017; Franks & Scherr,
2017) and that voting location may sway individuals to vote more or less secularly
(Berger, Meredith, & Weaver, 2008; Eidelman, Crandall, Goodman, & Blanchar, 2012;
Franks & Scherr, 2017; Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008; Mani,
Mullainathan, Shafir, & Zhao, 2013). For example, voting at a church might prime an
individual to vote more conservatively, whereas voting at a school is more likely to elicit
secular votes. Future studies could use a format similar to this study in a real-world
polling setting to determine if voting location also plays a role in bias toward candidates
based on religious identity.
This study found that Scientologists viewed the atheist candidate more favorably
than their own candidate. Research has suggested that even atheists are prejudiced
against other atheists, owing to negative perceptions that pervade US culture (Gervais et
al., 2017). As such, future research may want to examine if the “cult” label has
permeated US culture to the degree that even Scientologists view other Scientologists
negatively. Furthermore, it was found that Protestants reported the most fear toward all
candidates except their own. Future studies may want to examine this further, to
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determine if this trend continues to grow as privileged groups become less privileged and
diversity among political powerholders continues to grow. It is worth investigating if
fear of losing majority status contributes to Protestants’ discrimination toward minority
groups in the political arena and if this is related to increased diversity in the
contemporary US (Sandstrom, 2017).
Implications for Social Change
This study not only demonstrated that atheists are viewed poorly compared to a
more mainstream candidate, but also demonstrated how poorly minority religious groups
are viewed. The literature to date, combined with this study implies that groups labeled
“cult” are viewed poorly. These findings offer insights into the disparity in political
representation for these groups. Just as the Black Lives Matter movement has sparked
the current national conversation about racial inequality, likewise a conversation about
proportional political representation for all religious affiliations may be a step toward
achieving that end. Research has suggested that exposure minimizes prejudice towards
atheists (Gervais, 2011; Harms, 2011). Contact theory suggests that once people are
exposed to and interact with an otherwise unfamiliar group, their familiarity increases
and with it an understanding that the similarities are greater than their differences; this
contact has been found to reduce negative preconceptions that support prejudice (Gervais,
2011; Harms, 2011). Moreover, just awareness that the group is more commonplace than
previously believed, and therefore not so “fringe,” can have a similar impact in reducing
prejudice toward the group; however this is dependent on other factors as well, such as
whether the group may be viewed as a threat (Gervais, 2011; Harms, 2011).
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Conclusion
This study aimed to examine the comparative electability of atheist political
candidates with candidates from traditional and other nontraditional religious
backgrounds and to examine the emotions that may underlie perceptions of these
candidates. Findings demonstrated that while atheists did tend to score more negatively
(i.e., more fear, distrust, disgust), the Scientologist candidate overall fared the worst in
nearly all emotional measures as rated by ideologically dissimilar participants. With
greater understanding of the issues both atheists and nontraditional candidates face,
measures can be implemented to alleviate the discrimination these candidates face in an
attempt to increase equal and diverse representation in political office. Some examples
may include removing religious institutions as voting locations, as research suggests bias
is higher in these locations and impacts how individuals may vote (Berger, Meredith, &
Wheeler, 2008). Greater access to voting at home through mail may also alleviate
location bias to some extent. Political debates should focus on candidate policy and
debate rules should avoid a candidate’s religious beliefs as a litmus test for qualification.
Government offices might stop using religious books to swear elected officials in to
office and instead use the US constitution or a book of laws so that religious identity is
not highlighted. These steps may help alter the way people look at candidates and their
religious identities and in time reduce prejudiced attitudes; doing so may increase equal
and diverse representation in political office.
Lastly, findings from this study suggest that different religious groups elicit
different emotional reactions contingent on relatedness to that group. Emotions (e.g.,
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distrust) can be a knee-jerk reaction that precludes thoughtful consideration of what a
dissimilar group actually represents. To that end, greater contact/exposure to dissimilar
groups would create opportunities to discover and embrace their similarities thereby
suspending prejudicial perceptions that had once made exposure to each impossible. As
long as mainstream religious groups by virtue of their numbers, maintain power in
Congress, religious bias will likely continue to pervade lawmaking, marginalizing anyone
who does not subscribe to those beliefs.
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Appendix B: Letter of Permission

Andrew S. Franks, PhD
Assistant Professor of Psychology
Lake Superior State University
17 October 2017
Dear Colleagues,
This letter constitutes my approval for Brittany Bullock-Escobedo to utilize versions of materials
that I developed in the process of conducting the research detailed in the following source:
Franks, A. S. & Scherr, K. C. (2014). A socio-functional approach to prejudice at the polls: Are
atheists more politically disadvantaged than Blacks and gays? Journal of Applied Social
Psychology, 44, 681-691. DOI: 10.1111/jasp.12259.
Sincerely,

Andrew S. Franks, PhD
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Appendix C: Protestant Candidate Description
John is a 39-year-old Protestant male running for the U.S. House of
Representatives. He is married and has two children age 6 and 3. After graduating from
law school, he spent 10 years working as an assistant district attorney. In his spare time
he enjoys outdoor activities like hiking, kayaking, and skiing. His political agenda
prioritizes the economy, health care, and education.

183
Appendix D: Mormon Candidate Description
John is a 39-year-old Mormon male running for the U.S. House of
Representatives. He is married and has two children age 6 and 3. After graduating from
law school, he spent 10 years working as an assistant district attorney. In his spare time
he enjoys outdoor activities like hiking, kayaking, and skiing. His political agenda
prioritizes the economy, health care, and education.
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Appendix E: Scientologist Candidate Description
John is a 39-year-old Scientologist male running for the U.S. House of
Representatives. He is married and has two children age 6 and 3. After graduating from
law school, he spent 10 years working as an assistant district attorney. In his spare time
he enjoys outdoor activities like hiking, kayaking, and skiing. His political agenda
prioritizes the economy, health care, and education.
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Appendix F: Atheist Candidate Description
John is a 39-year-old atheist male running for the U.S. House of Representatives.
He is married and has two children age 6 and 3. After graduating from law school, he
spent 10 years working as an assistant district attorney. In his spare time he enjoys
outdoor activities like hiking, kayaking, and skiing. His political agenda prioritizes the
economy, health care, and education.
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Appendix G: Disgust Scale
7-Point Semantic Differential Scale: Disgust
Disgusting

Appealing
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Appendix H: Distrust Scale
7-Point Semantic Differential Scale: Distrust
Untrustworthy

Trustworthy
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Appendix I: Fear Scale
7-Point Semantic Differential Scale: Fear
Threatening

Comforting
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Appendix J: Voter Likelihood Scale
Voter Likelihood Scale
What is the likelihood you would vote for the candidate?
No Chance 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

100% Likely
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Appendix K: Pilot Study For Semantic Differential Scales (Franks & Scherr, 2014)
“Items for pilot study to confirm appropriateness of semantic differential scales. Numbers
in parentheses represent frequencies for each response.
1. How would you rate “appealing” as an antonym for “disgusting”?
A. Not at all acceptable as an antonym for “disgusting.” (0)
B. Inadequate. Much better choices exist. (0)
C. Adequate, but not nearly ideal. (1)
D. It works quite well, but there may be better choices. (18)
E. Ideal. (1)
2. When a person is described simply as “threatening,” which type of threat are you most
likely to think that person poses (select only one)?
A. A threat to take money or personal property that is rightfully yours or deny you access
to money or property that is rightfully yours. (0)
B. A threat to your physical well-being through direct violence (e.g., assault, battery, or
an attempt on your life). (18)
C. A threat of contamination through transmission of disease. (0)
D. Something else. (2)
*Although there may not be full agreement on the best antonym for disgust—Jon Haidt
(2003), for example, suggested a concept known as “elevation” as an opposite to moral
disgust—we felt that lay participants would recognize “appealing” as an antonym to
“disgusting” within the context of this research. Further, although “threat” may apply to
a variety of potential harms within the socio-functional framework, we felt that lay
participants would consider another person “threatening” because that person could cause
them violent physical harm. Both of these assumptions were supported by the results of a
two-item pilot survey distributed to 20 undergraduate research assistants naïve to the
purposes of the current study.”
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Appendix L: Informed Consent Form
You are invited to take part in a research study about your impressions of a political
candidate based on the amount of information that is presented. The researcher is
inviting all United States citizens of legal voting age (18) capable of reading in English to
the study. This form is part of a process called “informed consent” to allow you to
understand this study before deciding whether to take part.
This study is being conducted by a researcher named Brittany Escobedo, a doctoral
student at Walden University.
Background Information:
The purpose of this study is to determine how much information is necessary for voters
(participants) to form accurate impressions of political candidates. Data collected from
this confidential survey will be used for completion of a Ph.D. in Social Psychology at
Walden University.
Procedures:
If you agree to be in this study, you will be asked to:
• You will be asked to review a description that may vary in length and content on a
political candidate, and assess your intention to vote for the candidate.
• You will be asked to assess how the candidate makes you feel and provide three
short answers on a scale.
• The survey in total should take approximately 10 minutes to complete.

Voluntary Nature of the Study:
This study is voluntary. You are free to accept or turn down the invitation. If you decide
to be in the study now, you can still change your mind later. You may answer only the
questions you feel comfortable answering, and you may stop at any time. If you do
participate, completion and return of the survey indicates your consent to the above
conditions.
Risks and Benefits of Being in the Study:
Being in this type of study involves some risk of the minor discomforts that can be
encountered in daily life, such as stress or becoming upset. Being in this study would not
pose risk to your safety or wellbeing.
There are no risks or benefits to you in participating in this survey. The research benefit
will allow researchers to understand voter’s political preferences based on how
candidates present themselves.
Privacy:
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Reports coming out of this study will not share the identities of individual participants.
Details that might identify participants, such as the location of the study, also will not be
shared. Even the researcher will not know who you are. The researcher will not use your
personal information for any purpose outside of this research project. Data will be kept
secure by password protection on the researcher’s computer and on the Survey Monkey
website. Data will be kept for a period of at least 5 years, as required by the university.
Contacts and Questions:
You may ask any questions you have now. Or if you have questions later, you may
contact the researcher via email. If you want to talk privately about your rights as a
participant, you can call the Research Participant Advocate. Walden University’s
approval number for this study is 03-28-18-0504647 and it expires on March 27, 2019.
Please print or save this consent form for your records.
Obtaining Your Consent
If you feel you understand the study well enough to make a decision about it, please
indicate your consent by clicking the link below.
Please do not put your name on this form. The survey should take approximately 10
minutes to complete. Any questions or concerns should be directed to the principal
investigator, Brittany Escobedo.

Thank you for your time.
Sincerely,
Brittany Escobedo,
Walden University, School of Psychology
By clicking the link below, I confirm that I have read this form and decided that I will
participate in the project described above. Its general purposes, the particulars of
involvement, and possible risks and inconveniences have been explained to my
satisfaction. I understand that I can discontinue participation at any time. My consent also
indicates that I am at least 18 years of age. [Please feel free to print a copy of this consent
form.]

I agree to participate (link to survey)

I decline (link to close webpage)
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Appendix M: Debriefing Form
Thank you for participating in this study! We hope you enjoyed the experience. This
form provides background about our research to help you learn more about why we are
doing this study. Please feel free to ask any questions or to comment on any aspect of the
study.
You have just participated in a research study conducted by Brittany Escobedo.
You were told that the purpose of this study was to determine how much information is
necessary for voters (participants) to form accurate impressions of political candidates.
In actuality, we were interested in different reactions from participants to different
religious affiliations of political candidates, to determine if religious affiliation affects the
electability of non-Christian candidates. To protect the integrity of this research, we
could not fully divulge all the details of this study at the start of the procedure.
As you know, your participation in this study is voluntary. If you so wish, you may
withdraw after reading this debriefing form, at which point all records of your
participation will be destroyed.
Again, we thank you for your participation in this study. I request that you do not discuss
this project with others until after they have had the opportunity to participate. Prior
knowledge of the questions asked during the study can invalidate the results. I greatly
appreciate your cooperation.
You may print and keep a copy of this debriefing for your records.
If you have questions now about the research, please ask. If you have questions later,
please e-mail Brittany Escobedo or if you want to talk privately about your rights as a
participant, you can call the Research Participant Advocate. If, as a result of your
participation in this study, you experienced any adverse reaction, please contact the
Walden University IRB.
Thank you again for your participation,
Brittany Escobedo
Walden University, School of Psychology

